Dissent, Disagreement and Doctrinal Disarray: Free Expression and the Roberts Court in 2020 by Calvert, Clay
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 
Volume 28 (2019-2020) 
Issue 4 Article 2 
May 2020 
Dissent, Disagreement and Doctrinal Disarray: Free Expression 
and the Roberts Court in 2020 
Clay Calvert 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the 
Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Repository Citation 
Clay Calvert, Dissent, Disagreement and Doctrinal Disarray: Free Expression and the Roberts 
Court in 2020, 28 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 865 (2020), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/
vol28/iss4/2 
Copyright c 2020 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj 
DISSENT, DISAGREEMENT AND DOCTRINAL DISARRAY:
FREE EXPRESSION AND THE ROBERTS COURT IN 2020
Clay Calvert*
ABSTRACT
Using the United States Supreme Court’s 2019 rulings in Manhattan Community
Access Corp. v. Halleck, Nieves v. Bartlett, and Iancu v. Brunetti as analytical spring-
boards, this Article explores multiple fractures among the Justices affecting the First
Amendment freedoms of speech and press. All three cases involved dissents, with two
cases each spawning five opinions. The clefts compound problems witnessed in 2018
with a pair of five-to-four decisions in National Institute of Family and Life Advo-
cates v. Becerra and Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees. Partisan divides, the Article argues, are only one problem with First
Amendment jurisprudence as the Court enters the third decade of the twenty-first
century. Other troubles range from vehement disagreement in Nieves about crafting
a federal rule impacting both speech and press rights to a split in Brunetti over when
and how the Court should save a statute via a narrowing construction. Furthermore,
perceived political partisanship separates the Justices today not only on the standard
of scrutiny that applies in a case—Becerra and Janus rendered this vivid—but also
on a case’s framing and the concomitant selection of precedent to steer the inquiry, as
occurred in Halleck. Ultimately, the Article concludes that the rifts render free-ex-
pression jurisprudence even more muddled today than in the past. The Justices simply
are not operating from the same First Amendment playbook. Worse yet, they function
at times—particularly in cases such as Halleck—in a manner that strips away the
increasingly thin veneer that personal ideologies are set aside when deciding cases.
INTRODUCTION
Penning the majority opinion for the United States Supreme Court in the First
Amendment1 case of Terminiello v. Chicago, Justice William O. Douglas asserted
* Professor of Law, Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of
the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida in Gainesville,
Florida; BA, 1987, Communication, Stanford University; JD (Order of the Coif), 1991,
McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; PhD, 1996, Communication, Stanford
University. The author thanks University of Florida students Olivia Baruch, Eliana DuBosar,
Joel Kratt, Emily Lehman, Chasity Maynard, Alexandra Newman, and Yiwen Niu for their help-
ful reviews of drafts of this Article.
1 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress
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that “a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute”2
and that speech might “best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest.”3 That case centered on a breach-of-the-peace dispute stemming from a
heavily and angrily picketed address delivered by Arthur Terminiello in a Chicago
auditorium to more than 800 people.4
Seventy-one years later, Justice Douglas’s words are proving prescient. This
time, however, free speech is inviting disputes and provoking unrest among a much
smaller cadre of individuals—namely, the Supreme Court’s nine Justices. As this
Article argues, the Court’s free-expression jurisprudence is a disorderly and often
partisan mess, perhaps even more so than in the past, as it enters the 2020s.5
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety-five years ago
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply
to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925) (finding “that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the
First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights
and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from im-
pairment by the States”).
2 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 2–4. The speech was met by fierce protest and picketing outside the auditorium.
As the Supreme Court of Illinois described it:
An hour before the meeting, a strong picket line was formed in front of
the auditorium. The number in the picket line gradually increased to
several hundred and a crowd estimated at 1000 persons gathered outside
to protest the meeting. Despite the presence of approximately seventy
policemen, a number of disorders occurred. Some persons braved the
picket line. Others were escorted by police. . . . Missiles of all kinds were
thrown at the building. Twenty-eight windows were broken. Stench
bombs fell on the steps to the auditorium.
City of Chicago v. Terminiello, 79 N.E.2d 39, 41 (Ill. 1948).
5 This is not to say, however, that the situation in First Amendment law has either ever
or always been much better. As former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post wrote twenty
years ago, “The simple and absolute words of the First Amendment float atop a tumultuous
doctrinal sea. The free speech jurisprudence of the First Amendment is notorious for its flag-
rantly proliferating and contradictory rules, its profoundly chaotic collection of methods and
theories.” Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2355 (2000). More recently, Toni M. Massaro, Dean Emerita of the
University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law, bluntly wrote that free speech
doctrine is “extremely messy.” Toni M. Massaro, Tread On Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 370
(2014); see also Joshua D. Rosenberg & Joshua P. Davis, From Four Part Tests to First Prin-
ciples: Putting Free Speech Jurisprudence into Perspective, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 833, 834
(2012) (contending that “First Amendment law seems to have evolved into a morass of
apparently unrelated, hyper-technical, and generally incoherent three-and four-part tests that
more closely resemble the Internal Revenue Code and regulations than it does anything else
in the law”).
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To wit, briefly consider three cases decided in 2019 that collectively comprise
the heart of this Article: Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck,6 Nieves v.
Bartlett,7 and Iancu v. Brunetti.8 In Halleck, the Court split five to four.9 All five
Justices in the majority—John Roberts, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch,
and Brett Kavanaugh—were nominated by Republican presidents and are typically
considered conservative.10 Conversely, all four Justices in the dissent—Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan—were nominated
by Democratic presidents and are generally deemed liberal.11
6 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019). On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court and in accord with that
decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in August 2019 affirmed the earlier
judgment of a federal district court dismissing the First Amendment claim of DeeDee Halleck
and Jesus Papoleto Melendez. Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 774 F. App’x 41, 41
(2d Cir. 2019); see Halleck v. City of New York, 224 F. Supp. 3d 238, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(concluding that the plaintiffs failed to successfully plead that the Manhattan Community Access
Corporation, operating as the Manhattan Neighborhood Network (“MNN”), was a state actor,
and dismissing the First Amendment claim against MNN accordingly for lack of state action).
7 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019). On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court and in accordance
with that decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case “to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion.” Bartlett
v. Nieves, 926 F.3d 1179, 1180 (9th Cir. 2019).
8 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
9 See Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1925 (identifying the Justices in the majority and dissenting
opinions).
10 See Current Members, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biogra
phies.aspx [https://perma.cc/9JJ6-CPQ5] (identifying the President of the United States who
nominated each of the current Justices) (last visited Apr. 14, 2020); see also Adam Liptak,
Supreme Court Won’t Hear Planned Parenthood Cases, and 3 Court Conservatives Aren’t
Happy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/10/us/politics/planned
-parenthood-supreme-court.html [https://nyti.ms/2G8zqDd] (identifying Justices Thomas,
Alito, and Gorsuch as “the [C]ourt’s three most conservative justices,” and Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh as “the [C]ourt’s other conservatives”).
11 See Current Members, supra note 10 (identifying the President of the United States
who nominated each of the current Justices); see also Robert Barnes, Divided Supreme Court
Says Execution Can Proceed—But the Death Warrant Had Already Expired, WASH. POST
(Apr. 12, 2019, 5:12 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/divided-su
preme-court-says-execution-can-proceed--but-the-death-warrant-had-already-expired
/2019/04/12/01b17484-5d16-11e9-a00e-050dc7b82693_story.html [https://perma.cc/HTZ4
-VUWF] (identifying Justice Breyer’s “fellow liberal colleagues” as Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan); David G. Savage & Suhauna Hussain, Supreme Court Rules Apple
Can Face Antitrust Suits From iPhone Owners Over App Store Sales, L.A. TIMES (May 13,
2019, 7:27 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-supreme-court-apple-smart
-phone-20190513-story.html [https://perma.cc/472F-EWKS] (reporting that in the case of
Apple v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019), Justice Kavanaugh was “joined by the [C]ourt’s
four liberal justices,” and identifying the Justices joining Kavanaugh as Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan).
868 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:865
The conservative quintet framed12 its decision in Halleck as fighting the danger
that big government poses to individual liberties.13 In doing so, the majority pro-
tected the Manhattan Neighborhood Network (MNN)—a private, non-profit corpo-
ration that operates public-access cable channels in New York City—from being
treated as a government actor and thus allowing it to escape the First Amendment’s
free-speech strictures14 under the state action doctrine.15 Writing for the majority,
Justice Brett Kavanaugh reasoned that the Court’s 1974 ruling in Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co.16 supplied the relevant precedent for deciding if MNN should be
treated as a state (or governmental)17 actor.18 Jackson, as explained later,19 articulates
12 See Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 43
J. COMM. 51, 52 (1993) (asserting that “[t]o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment rec-
ommendation for the item described” (emphasis omitted)); Dietram A. Scheufele & David
Tewksbury, Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects
Models, 57 J. COMM. 9, 12 (2007) (noting that “the term ‘framing’ refers to modes of pre-
sentation that journalists and other communicators use to present information in a way that
resonates with existing underlying schemas among their audience” (citations omitted)).
13 As Justice Kavanaugh reasoned for the Halleck majority:
It is sometimes said that the bigger the government, the smaller the in-
dividual. Consistent with the text of the Constitution, the state-action
doctrine enforces a critical boundary between the government and the
individual, and thereby protects a robust sphere of individual liberty.
Expanding the state-action doctrine beyond its traditional boundaries
would expand governmental control while restricting individual liberty
and private enterprise.
Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1934. Kavanaugh’s observation here about individual liberty tracks
Justice Byron White’s contention that “[c]areful adherence to the ‘state action’ requirement
preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal
judicial power.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
14 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1926 (“In operating the public access channels, MNN is a private
actor, not a state actor, and MNN therefore is not subject to First Amendment constraints on
its editorial discretion.”).
15 For more information about the state action doctrine, see Isaac Saidel-Goley & Joseph
William Singer, Things Invisible to See: State Action & Private Property, 5 TEX. A&M L.
REV. 439, 445 (2018) (“The state action doctrine is the principle that the scope of the United
States Constitution is limited to governmental conduct and does not extend to the behavior
of private persons.”); Louis Michael Seidman, State Action and the Constitution’s Middle
Band, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2018) (noting that “the state action doctrine embodies the
principle that government action—rather than action taken by private individuals—triggers
constitutional limitations”).
16 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
17 See Jed Rubenfeld, Privatization and State Action: Do Campus Sexual Assault Hearings
Violate Due Process?, 96 TEX. L. REV. 15, 27 (2017) (noting that the word “state,” as used
in the state action doctrine, “means governmental (not Montana or Idaho)”).
18 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1928–34.
19 See infra notes 119–23 and accompanying text (discussing Jackson and the rule it created).
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a public function exception to the state action doctrine’s general principle20 that the
Constitution applies only to governmental actors, not private ones.21
In diametric opposition, the dissent framed the case not as about the dangers of
big government, but rather as one involving a simple agency relationship in which
the government (New York City) delegated its duties to operate a public forum
(public access channels) to a private entity (MNN), thus transforming the private
entity into a state actor.22 Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in authoring the dissent, pulled
no punches in hammering Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion. In her opening sentence,
she derided the majority, as if it were writing fiction, for creating a “story about a
case that is not before us.”23 Sotomayor ended her opinion by calling the majority’s
decision “misguided.”24
In between, she reasoned that the Court’s decision in West v. Atkins25—not, as
the majority found, its ruling in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.26—supplied the
correct precedent for determining whether MNN was a government actor.27 In
holding that MNN was, indeed, a state actor,28 the dissent would have allowed the
First Amendment case of DeeDee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez, two local
20 See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1229 (1999) (noting
that the state action doctrine embodies “the general principle that constitutional rights, at both
the federal and state levels, operate only against the government”).
21 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 544 (5th ed.
2015).
22 As Justice Sonia Sotomayor reasoned for the dissent:
This is not a case about bigger governments and smaller individuals . . . ;
it is a case about principals and agents. New York City opened up a pub-
lic forum on public-access channels in which it has a property interest.
It asked MNN to run that public forum, and MNN accepted the job.
That makes MNN subject to the First Amendment, just as if the City
had decided to run the public forum itself.
Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1945 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
23 Id. at 1934.
24 Id. at 1945.
25 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
26 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
27 Justice Sotomayor reasoned here that:
West resolves this case. Although the settings are different, the legal
features are the same: When a government (1) makes a choice that
triggers constitutional obligations, and then (2) contracts out those
constitutional responsibilities to a private entity, that entity—in
agreeing to take on the job—becomes a state actor for purposes of
§ 1983.
Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1940 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
28 See id. at 1945 (arguing that “as long as MNN continues to wield the power it was
given by the government, it stands in the government’s shoes and must abide by the First
Amendment like any other government actor”).
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producers of public-access programming who claimed MNN punished them for the
content of an anti-MNN film they made,29 to proceed.
In brief, the conservative and liberal Justices not only disagreed on the outcome in
Halleck, but also on its factual framing and the applicable case-law precedent. Un-
fortunately, this state of affairs was largely unsurprising. That is because the Justices
divided five to four along the exact same partisan lines in a pair of 2018 First
Amendment rulings—National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra30
and Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees.31 In
Becerra and Janus, the Justices not only differed over the result, but they also
diverged on the applicable standard of scrutiny by which to measure the laws at
issue in those cases.32
The distinct danger is that such partisan rifts will exacerbate the already growing
gap in public confidence between Republicans and Democrats when it comes to
trusting the U.S. Supreme Court. Most notably, a Pew Research Center survey released
in August 2019 revealed that “three-quarters of Republicans and Republican-leaning
29 See id. at 1927 (majority opinion) (“The two producers claimed that MNN violated
their First Amendment free-speech rights when MNN restricted their access to the public
access channels because of the content of their film.”).
30 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). In Becerra, the Court considered whether a state statute (the
California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency
Act) that compelled anti-abortion crisis pregnancy centers to disclose certain information,
including the fact that California offers low-cost and free abortion services, violated the
centers’ First Amendment right of free speech. Id. at 2368. The five Justices nominated by
Republican presidents—John Roberts, Clarence Thomas, Anthony Kennedy, Samuel Alito,
and Neil Gorsuch—ruled for the religious-based, anti-abortion centers and concluded that
the law likely violated their First Amendment rights. Id. at 2368–78. The four Justices nomi-
nated by Democratic presidents—Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor,
and Elena Kagan—disagreed and joined in a dissent penned by Breyer. Id. at 2379 (Breyer,
J., dissenting); see supra notes 10–11 (providing information on who nominated the Justices
and their political leanings).
31 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). In Janus, the five conservative Justices held that a state law
compelling public employees who are not union members to pay an agency fee to the union
that represents them in collective bargaining violated the First Amendment. Id. at 2486. The
four liberal Justices, in a dissent authored by Elena Kagan, accused the conservatives of “turn-
ing the First Amendment into a sword, and using it against workaday economic and regu-
latory policy.” Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). She accused the majority of “weaponizing
the First Amendment” and using it against the “state and local governments (and the constituents
they serve) [that] think that stable unions promote healthy labor relations and thereby improve
the provision of services to the public.” Id. at 2501. More briefly put, the First Amendment
was used to bludgeon unions. See id.
32 See generally Clay Calvert, Is Everything a Full-Blown First Amendment Case After
Becerra and Janus? Sorting Out Standards of Scrutiny and Untangling “Speech as Speech”
Cases From Disputes Incidentally Affecting Expression, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 73 (2019)
(reviewing the disagreements among the Justices in both Becerra and Janus).
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independents have a favorable opinion of the Supreme Court, compared with only
about half (49%) of Democrats and Democratic leaners . . . . The 26 percentage-
point difference between the two parties is among the widest it has been over the
past two decades.”33 Continued partisan splits on the Supreme Court in First Amend-
ment cases, one might assume, will further widen this gulf, particularly among
individuals who identify themselves as liberal Democrats.34
Furthermore, a May 2019 Quinnipiac University poll of more than 1,000
registered voters nationwide revealed that a majority—55%—thinks that the Su-
preme Court is mainly motivated by politics.35 In contrast, only 38% of respondents
thought the Court was mainly motivated by the law.36 The 55% figure for those who
think the Court is mainly motivated by politics is particularly worrisome because,
only ten months earlier, a smaller percentage—50%—believed that was the case.37
In brief, the Court’s credibility in the public’s mind, as an institution “free from political
pressure,”38 is eroding. Politically divided free-expression decisions such as Halleck,
Becerra, and Janus in the span of just two Terms surely aggravate the problem.
It is not, however, just perceived politics or ideologies that divide the Justices
today. Consider Nieves v. Bartlett,39 another case at the center of this Article.40
Pivoting on the question of whether the existence of probable cause41 to arrest a
33 Claire Brockway & Bradley Jones, Partisan Gap Widens in Views of the Supreme Court,
PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/07/partisan
-gap-widens-in-views-of-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/D263-HUY4].
34 Specifically, the Pew Research Center study found that:
The widening partisan gap has been largely driven by liberal Democrats,
who have become much more negative in their views. Just 40% of liberal
Democrats currently have a favorable view of the Supreme Court—the
lowest percentage among this group in at least 15 years. Liberal Demo-
crats are now far less likely than conservative and moderate Democrats
(57% favorable)—or Republicans regardless of ideology—to view the
court positively.
Id.
35 Press Release at 2, Quinnipiac Univ. Poll, U.S. Voter Support for Abortion Is High,
Quinnipiac Univ. Nat’l Poll Finds; 94 Percent Back Universal Gun Background Checks
(May 22, 2019), https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/us/us05222019_usch361.pdf [https://perma
.cc/TJS4-WYQD].
36 Id.
37 See id. at 3 (noting the polling results released in July 2018).
38 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Consti-
tutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1254 (1984).
39 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019).
40 See infra Part II (addressing Nieves).
41 See Amanda Peters, Mass Arrests & the Particularized Probable Cause Requirement,
60 B.C. L. REV. 217, 218 (2019) (“The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly described probable
cause as the facts and circumstances the officer knows that would warrant a reasonable, prudent
person in believing a criminal offense has been, is being, or will be committed by the suspect.”).
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person under the Fourth Amendment42 defeats that person’s Section 1983 claim43
that the arrest was wrongfully made in retaliation for exercising First Amendment
rights,44 Nieves produced five separate opinions, including three (either partial or
full) dissents.45 In delivering the Court’s opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts fashioned
a federal rule for Section 1983 lawsuits: a finding of probable cause to arrest a
person defeats that person’s claim that the arrest was wrongfully made in retaliation
for the person exercising his First Amendment rights, unless the person can “pres-
ent[] objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated
individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.”46
Roberts explained that the back-half of this rule—the exception or qualification
to the general principle that a finding of probable cause will defeat a First Amend-
ment retaliatory arrest claim—is designed “for circumstances where officers have
42 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment was incorporated more than fifty-five years
ago through the Due Process Clause as a fundamental freedom to apply to all government actors.
See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 108 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
43 This refers to a lawsuit claiming a federal civil rights violation by a state official under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107
CALIF. L. REV. 933, 936 (2019) (“A signal development came in 1871, when Congress en-
acted 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action for damages or injunctive relief
against state officials who violate federal constitutional rights.”). That statute provides, in
key part, that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a decla-
ratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). The underlying premise of the statute is “that federal courts should
have the power to vindicate federal rights.” Arturo Peña Miranda, Comment, “Where There
Is a Right (Against Excessive Force), There Is Also a Remedy”: Redress for Police Violence
Under the Equal Protection Clause, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1678, 1713 (2018).
44 See Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1721 (“We are asked to resolve whether probable cause to
make an arrest defeats a claim that the arrest was in retaliation for speech protected by the
First Amendment.”).
45 See id. at 1719 (identifying the five opinions in the case).
46 Id. at 1727.
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probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to do so.”47
Parsing the new rule in a slightly different fashion, a Section 1983 plaintiff filing a
First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim after Nieves must prove there was no probable
cause to arrest him—a “no-probable-cause requirement”48—in order to proceed with
a claim, unless he can show there was probable cause to arrest both him and other
similarly situated individuals, yet those other individuals: (1) were not engaged in
the same type of protected speech as the plaintiff, and (2) were not arrested.
The problem, as explained in greater detail in Part II, is that four Justices ob-
jected either to part or all of this new federal rule, thereby weakening its strength and
indicating that a relatively minor change in the composition of the Court could spell its
demise.49 For now, it suffices to briefly review the disagreements among the Justices.
In particular, Justice Clarence Thomas issued a solo opinion objecting to the
back-half exception facet of the rule.50 He bluntly reasoned that it “has no basis in
either the common law or our First Amendment precedents.”51 For Justice Thomas,
there is no need for an exception or qualification to the first part of the rule, which
requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the absence of probable cause to arrest.52
Justice Neil Gorsuch objected in Nieves to the Court creating a cut-and-dried rule
regarding the impact of probable cause in First Amendment–based retaliatory arrest
claims under Section 1983.53 He was also troubled by a separation-of-powers issue,54
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See infra Part II (addressing Nieves).
50 Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1728 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment).
51 Id.
52 See id. at 1730 (“The requirement that plaintiffs bringing First Amendment retaliatory-
arrest claims plead and prove the absence of probable cause is supported by the common law
and our First Amendment precedents. The majority’s new exception has no basis in either.”).
53 See id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“But rather than
attempt to sort out precisely when and how probable cause plays a role in First Amendment
claims, I would reserve decision on those questions until they are properly presented to this
Court and we can address them with the benefit of full adversarial testing.”).
54 See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (“The Constitution enumerates and sep-
arates the powers of the three branches of Government in Articles I, II, and III, and it is this
‘very structure’ of the Constitution that exemplifies the concept of separation of powers.” (quot-
ing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983))); see also David A. Carrillo & Danny Y.
Chou, California Constitutional Law: Separation of Powers, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 655, 657 (2011)
(observing that the separation of powers doctrine “was woven into the design of the Federal
Constitution and the very structure of the articles defining, delegating, and separating the powers
of the three branches of the federal government,” and adding that the doctrine “secures liberty
in the fundamental political sense of the term, by placing structural limits on the ability of any
branch of the government to influence basic political decisions” (citations omitted)); Patrick M.
Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly Effected a Shift in the
Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689, 694–95 (2006) (“The doctrine of separation of
powers, in its purest form, states that the preservation of political liberty requires that
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with the Court reading into Section 1983 a probable cause requirement when the text
of that statute is silent on this point.55 It is better left to Congress to amend the
statute with a probable cause mandate, he intimated, rather than have the Court read
one into it.56
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg objected to the majority’s test in its entirety,
concluding that it will “leave press members and others exercising First Amendment
rights with little protection against police suppression of their speech.”57 This is
especially important because Ginsburg recognizes that the new rule from Nieves
affects not only free speech rights, but also the rights of journalists.58 For Justice
Ginsburg, the correct rule to apply is the balancing test the Court fashioned more
than forty years ago in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle.59 That case did not involve an arrest, but rather pivoted on the plaintiff’s
claim that a school district chose not to rehire him in retaliation for speaking out on
a radio station regarding a school matter.60
Moreover, Justice Sonia Sotomayor agreed in her dissent with Ginsburg that Mt.
Healthy supplies the appropriate rule in First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims.61 In
the process, she criticized the majority for creating a rule that “risks letting flagrant vio-
lations go unremedied”62 and that, under the exception facet to the general rule that
probable cause defeats a retaliatory arrest claim, “arbitrarily insist[s] upon comparison-
based evidence”63 and “reject[s] direct evidence of unconstitutional motives.”64
government be divided into three branches and that each branch be given a corresponding iden-
tifiable function—e.g., legislative, executive, or judicial.”).
55 Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1730.
56 Justice Gorsuch reasoned here that “[m]aybe it would be good policy to graft a no-
probable-cause requirement onto the statute, as the officers insist; or maybe not. Either way,
that’s an appeal better directed to Congress than to this Court. Our job isn’t to write or revise leg-
islative policy but to apply it faithfully.” Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
57 Id. at 1735 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in part).
58 See supra note 57, infra notes 214–17, 291–95 and accompanying text (exploring or
ruminating on the possible impact of the Nieves test on both professional journalists and
citizen journalists).
59 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Justice Ginsburg wrote:
I remain of the view that the Court’s decision in Mt. Healthy City Bd.
of Ed. v. Doyle . . . strikes the right balance: The plaintiff bears the
burden of demonstrating that unconstitutional animus was a motivating
factor for an adverse action; the burden then shifts to the defendant to
demonstrate that, even without any impetus to retaliate, the defendant
would have taken the action complained of.
Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1734–35 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in part)
(internal citation omitted).
60 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282–84.
61 Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1742 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 1735.
63 Id. at 1737.
64 Id. at 1738–39.
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Furthermore, and as discussed more extensively in Part II,65 she focused on the
danger that the exception facet of the new rule poses to citizen journalists who use
cell phones to film police performing their duties.66
In brief, this is no way to produce a durable federal rule affecting the First
Amendment rights of speech and press. Four Justices—two nominated by Republi-
can presidents (Thomas and Gorsuch), two nominated by Democratic presidents
(Ginsburg and Sotomayor)—disagree with it in either some or all aspects. At the
very least, this is an inauspicious start for a test that may hinder journalists as they
play a watchdog role on police activities.67
Finally, briefly consider Iancu v. Brunetti,68 the third of the trio of 2019 First
Amendment decisions addressed in this Article.69 The Court there concluded that a
federal statutory provision70 that allowed the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) to deny registration for immoral or scandalous marks violated the First
Amendment because it allowed the PTO to engage in viewpoint discrimination.71 The
ruling enabled Erik Brunetti to register “FUCT” as the mark for a brand of clothing.72
Although six Justices agreed with this result, Brunetti nonetheless generated five
opinions, including three that dissented in part and would have narrowly interpreted
the term “scandalous” to save it,73 and one that, although refusing to give “scandal-
ous” a limiting construction, offered Congress a virtual roadmap for redrafting that part
of the statute in constitutional fashion.74 In brief, Brunetti exposes disagreements
65 See supra notes 57–58, infra notes 214–17, 291–95 and accompanying text (exploring
the possible impact of the Nieves test on both professional journalists and citizen journalists).
66 Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1740.
67 See infra notes 214–17, 291–95 and accompanying text (exploring the possible impact
of the Nieves test on both professional journalists and citizen journalists).
68 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
69 See infra Part III (addressing Brunetti). See generally Clay Calvert, Iancu v. Brunetti’s
Impact on First Amendment Law: Viewpoint Discrimination, Modes of Offensive Expression,
Proportionality and Profanity, 43 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 37 (2019) (providing a comprehen-
sive analysis of other issues in Brunetti not addressed in this Article).
70 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2019). The relevant part of the statute allows the PTO to deny regis-
tration if a mark “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter.” Id.
(emphasis added).
71 See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2300 (“The facial viewpoint bias in the law results in viewpoint-
discriminatory application.”).
72 The PTO had blocked Brunetti’s efforts to register “FUCT” under the immoral or
scandalous provision. Id. at 2297–98.
73 Id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 2304 (Breyer,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
74 See id. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Our decision does not prevent Congress from
adopting a more carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks containing
vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas.”).
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among the Justices about when it is proper for the Court to exercise the “cardinal
principle of statutory construction”75 of adopting a saving interpretation.76
In summary, a mere three cases—Halleck, Nieves, and Brunetti—generated
twelve opinions. Justice Sotomayor proved the least likely to go along with the
majority, penning opinions that dissented, either in part or full, in all three disputes.77
She was joined by all of her liberal colleagues (Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) in
Halleck78 and by one (Breyer) in Brunetti.79 At the opposite end of the continuum,
Justice Kavanaugh was the only Justice who was part of the majority in all three
cases and who did not either write or join a concurrence or dissent.80 Across the trio
of cases, Chief Justice Roberts81 and Justices Ginsburg,82 Breyer,83 and Gorsuch84
each authored opinions dissenting in part, while Justices Thomas85 and Alito86
drafted concurrences.
Part I of this Article examines in greater detail partisan disagreements among the
Justices in Halleck over the state action doctrine and, in turn, the First Amendment.87
Part II then delves more deeply into the multiple splits in Nieves,88 while Part III does
the same for Brunetti.89 Ultimately, the Article concludes by contending that the Court,
in its free-expression jurisprudence, now must (1) rise above continuing ideological
divides in cases such as Halleck that simultaneously erode any semblance of doctrinal
75 Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937). The
Court added in Jones & Laughlin that “as between two possible interpretations of a statute,
by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt
that which will save the act.” Id.
76 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 562 (2012) (“And it is well
established that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitu-
tion, courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so.”).
77 See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1934 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dis-
senting); Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1735 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
78 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1934.
79 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2308.
80 Justice Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion in Halleck. See Halleck, 139 S. Ct.
at 1925 (noting that Kavanaugh “delivered the opinion of the Court”). Kavanaugh joined the
majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts in Nieves. See Nieves,139 S. Ct. at 1719
(noting that Kavanaugh joined the opinion of the Court delivered by Roberts). He also joined
the majority opinion authored by Justice Kagan in Brunetti. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297
(reporting that Kavanaugh joined the opinion of the Court delivered by Kagan).
81 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
82 Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1734 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
83 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
84 Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1730 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
85 Id. at 1728 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
86 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302 (Alito, J., concurring).
87 Infra Part I.
88 Infra Part II.
89 Infra Part III.
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coherence and any confidence in the Court as a government entity functioning in a
politically non-partisan manner; (2) deliver opinions, particularly in disputes such
as Nieves that feature attempts to fashion definitive federal rules, that are either much
more unified (in terms of agreement among the Justices) or minimalistic (in terms of
scope and impact) when such unity is nigh impossible; and (3) resolve differences,
especially in cases akin to Brunetti that pivot on statutory interpretation, regarding
when speech-restricting statutes should be afforded saving constructions and when,
in contrast, it should be left to lawmakers to cure the statutory deficiencies.
In brief, there are lessons to be learned from a fractious Supreme Court term and
three very divisive cases. The Article next examines Halleck.
I. MANHATTAN COMMUNITY ACCESS CORP. V. HALLECK: WEAPONIZING THE
STATE ACTION DOCTRINE TO DEFEAT A FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM?
Among “the traditional structural paradigms”90 for analyzing a case or fact pat-
tern is the Issue-Rule-Analysis-Conclusion (IRAC) formula.91 As one scholar rather
wryly writes, “IRAC is seen as both the bane of law student existence and as having
a near-magical ability to create a successful exam outcome.”92 A key facet of this
“yellow-brick-road” strategy for academic achievement is identifying the appropri-
ate rule to apply when analyzing an issue and a collection of facts.93
If law students sometimes are flummoxed in choosing the correct rule when
deploying IRAC’s methodology, then they should take solace in Manhattan Com-
munity Access Corp. v. Halleck.94 That is because even the Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court could not agree on the correct rule to apply to determine if Manhattan Neigh-
borhood Network (MNN), a private, non-profit entity that operates public access
cable channels in New York City, should be deemed a state actor subject to the First
Amendment’s doctrines. In turn, and as explained later, the selection of different
90 Jennifer Sheppard, Once Upon a Time, Happily Ever After, and in a Galaxy Far, Far
Away: Using Narrative to Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by Overreliance on Pure Logic in Ap-
pellate Briefs and Motion Memoranda, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 255, 283 (2009).
91 See Jacob M. Carpenter, Identifying Inefficiencies: Exploring Ways to Write Briefs
More Quickly Within the Time Demands of Legal Practice, 18 WYO. L. REV. 409, 436 (2018)
(citations omitted) (identifying the IRAC formula as one of “the basic organizational paradigms
taught in law schools”).
92 Soma R. Kedia, Redirecting the Scope of First-Year Writing Courses: Toward a New
Paradigm of Teaching Legal Writing, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 147, 150 (2010).
93 See id. (noting that under IRAC, a key is to apply a “rule to a given set of facts using
analogy and distinction. The pattern can be adapted for statutory analysis and policy argument,
but the essential structure stays the same: the rule is always the central element of the inquiry”);
see also Bret Rappaport, Using the Elements of Rhythm, Flow, and Tone to Create a More
Effective and Persuasive Acoustic Experience in Legal Writing, 16 LEGAL WRITING 65, 67
(2010) (identifying IRAC as the “yellow brick road” in legal writing (emphasis omitted)).
94 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019).
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rules by the conservative and liberal Justices resulted in them reaching polar oppo-
site conclusions that, in terms of the end result in Halleck, comport with broad-based
ideological stereotypes.95 In IRAC parlance, selection of a different “R” by each
bloc of Justices caused it to reach a different “C” than the other one.
Furthermore—and critically for purposes of reaching the outcome against the
First Amendment rights of the filmmakers in Halleck—the majority and dissent
analyzed two critical issues in a very different sequence. Those issues were: (1) a
state action question (Should MNN be treated as a state actor?), and (2) a First
Amendment question (Are public access channels public forums in which the gov-
ernment cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination?).96
For the majority, the only issue—the determinative, case-killing one for the
filmmakers97—was whether MNN was a state actor. As Justice Kavanaugh put it,
to first analyze whether running public access channels is the same thing as operat-
ing “a public forum for speech”98 is to put the proverbial cart before the horse
because it “mistakenly ignores the threshold state-action question.”99
In contrast, the Halleck dissent started with the First Amendment question and
concluded that “public-access channels are a public forum.”100 It only then turned
to the state action issue, with Justice Sotomayor reasoning that:
If New York’s public-access channels are a public forum, it
follows that New York cannot evade the First Amendment by
contracting out administration of that forum to a private agent.
When MNN took on the responsibility of administering the forum,
it stood in the City’s shoes and became a state actor . . . .101
In brief, because the majority first found that operating public access channels did
not make MNN a state actor,102 there was no need to analyze the First Amendment
question of whether those same channels are public forums. Contrarily, because the
dissent started with the First Amendment issue and determined that public access
95 See infra notes 131–32 and accompanying text (addressing these stereotypes).
96 See Dawn Carla Nunziato, From Town Square to Twittersphere: The Public Forum Doc-
trine Goes Digital, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 3 (2019) (noting that the Supreme Court’s
public forum doctrine “provides strong protections for freedom of speech and assembly and . . .
prohibits government officials from discriminating against or silencing speakers based on
their viewpoint,” and adding that the public forum doctrine “traditionally applies to government-
owned or controlled, rather than privately-owned or controlled, property”).
97 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (identifying the filmmakers in Halleck).
98 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1930.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1939 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 1939–40.
102 See infra notes 119–29 and accompanying text (explaining how the majority reached this
conclusion by applying the rule from Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)).
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channels are public forums triggering constitutional concerns, then finding that
MNN was a state actor was relatively easy, as New York City simply had delegated
the channels’ operation to MNN, letting “it s[tand] in the City’s shoes.”103
Before examining the different rules applied in Halleck and how they were
chosen, it helps to understand what public access channels are and how MNN came
to operate them in Manhattan. The Federal Communications Commission explains
on its website that “public access channels are available for use by the general
public.”104 A federal statute permits governmental entities to require cable system
operators (Comcast, Charter, Cox, etc.) that are awarded franchises to supply cable in
particular locales to create and set aside space in their packages for such channels.105
As is relevant in Halleck, the state of New York embraced this federal opportu-
nity by adopting a statute that requires “[e]very cable television franchisee” with a
minimum capacity of thirty-six channels to create “at least one full-time activated
channel for public access use.”106 Gaining time on a public access channel, per New
York law, is determined “on a first-come, first-served, nondiscriminatory basis,”107
with such channels being designated only “for noncommercial use.”108 Municipali-
ties in New York, in turn, may designate an entity to administer these channels.109
Editorial control by governmental municipalities and cable company franchisees over
the content appearing on public access channels is severely limited to obscenity110
and other types of speech not protected by the First Amendment.111
In Halleck, New York City entered into a cable-franchise agreement with Time
Warner (now known as Charter).112 As described above, this meant that under New
103 See Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1939–40 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also infra notes
167–73 and accompanying text (explaining the dissent’s logic on the delegation issue under
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)).
104 Public, Educational, and Governmental Access Channels (“PEG Channels”), FED.
COMM. COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/media/public-educational-and-governmental-ac
cess-channels-peg-channels [https://perma.cc/B9QV-5SGQ] (last updated Dec. 9, 2015).
105 47 U.S.C. § 531(b) (2012).
106 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 895.4(b)(1) (2019).
107 Id. § 895.4(c)(4).
108 Id. § 895.4(a)(1).
109 Id. § 895.4(c)(1).
110 Obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment. See Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (concluding that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally pro-
tected speech or press”); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (establishing
the current three-part test for determining when speech is obscene).
111 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 895.4(c)(8)–(9).
112 See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1927 (2019) (“Time
Warner (now known as Charter) operates a cable system in Manhattan.”); id. at 1935
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Years ago, New York City (no longer a party to this suit) and
Time Warner Entertainment Company (never a party to this suit) entered into a cable-franchise
agreement. . . . Time Warner received a cable franchise; the City received public-access
channels.” (internal citation omitted)).
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York law, Time Warner had to create public access channels for New York City.113
New York City, in turn, designated MNN “to operate Time Warner’s public access
channels in Manhattan.”114 The question at the heart of Halleck—whether MNN, a
private entity, should nonetheless be treated as a state actor subject to the First
Amendment’s provisions115—arose after MNN suspended DeeDee Halleck’s and
Jesus Papoleto Melendez’s access to its facilities.116 The pair produced public access
programming in Manhattan and alleged being suspended because of the content of
a film they made “about MNN’s alleged neglect of the East Harlem community.”117
They claimed the suspension violated their First Amendment freedom of speech.118
A key question thus was whether MNN, despite being a private entity, should be
treated as a state actor subject to the First Amendment.
The five conservative Justices, in an opinion written by Brett Kavanaugh, picked
a rule from the case of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.119 to resolve the state
action question. In Jackson, the Court concluded that a privately owned business
(Metropolitan Edison) authorized by a state commission to supply electricity to
residents of York, Pennsylvania, was not a state actor despite it being heavily regu-
lated by the commission and holding a partial monopoly over electrical services in
that geographic area.120
As parsed by Justice Kavanaugh in Halleck, the rule from Jackson narrowly
holds that a private entity should be treated as a government actor if it “performs a
traditional, exclusive public function.”121 Indeed, the Court in Jackson observed that
government action is “present in the exercise by a private entity of powers tradition-
ally exclusively reserved to the State.”122 In Jackson, a six-Justice majority con-
cluded that, in Pennsylvania, supplying a “utility service is not traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the State.”123
Applying this rule to the facts in Halleck, the majority held that MNN was not
a state actor.124 It reasoned that operating public access cable channels “has not
113 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 895.4(b)(1).
114 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1927.
115 See id. at 1926 (“The question here is whether MNN—even though it is a private entity—
nonetheless is a state actor when it operates the public access channels.”).
116 Id. at 1927.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
120 Id. at 346, 358–59.
121 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1928 (citations omitted).
122 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352 (citations omitted).
123 Id. at 353. In reaching this conclusion, the majority reasoned that “Pennsylvania courts
have rejected the contention that the furnishing of utility services is either a state function or
a municipal duty.” Id.
124 Justice Kavanaugh explained:
Operating public access channels on a cable system is not a traditional,
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traditionally and exclusively been performed by government,”125 citing two significant
facts. These facts were that, historically across the country, “a variety of private and
public actors have operated public access channels”126 and that, more geographically
specific, “early Manhattan public access channels were operated in large part by private
cable operators, with some help from private nonprofit organizations.”127 This pro-
vided an entrée for Kavanaugh to conclude that “operating public access channels on
a cable system is not a traditional, exclusive public function within the meaning of this
Court’s cases.”128 He also cited Jackson favorably for the proposition that a business
does not become a state actor simply because it faces heavy government regulation.129
This outcome meant that MNN could freely discriminate against Halleck and
Melendez based on content they produced without triggering the First Amendment’s
prohibition against viewpoint censorship.130 Fitting perhaps the broadest of stereo-
types about conservatives, Kavanaugh dubbed it a victory for “individual liberty and
private enterprise”131 over the intrusive powers of big government that would have
plagued MNN had the First Amendment applied.132 This framing comports with what
exclusive public function. A private entity such as MNN who opens its
property for speech by others is not transformed by that fact alone into
a state actor. Under the text of the Constitution and our precedents,
MNN is not a state actor subject to the First Amendment.
Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1934.
125 Id. at 1929.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1929–30.
128 Id. at 1930.
129 Id. at 1932.
130 See id. at 1927 (“The two producers claimed that MNN violated their First Amendment
free-speech rights when MNN restricted their access to the public access channels because
of the content of their film.”). Viewpoint-based censorship is generally prohibited under the
First Amendment. As former Justice Anthony Kennedy recently explained, viewpoint
discrimination is “a form of speech suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous
constitutional scrutiny.” Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in judgment). It occurs when, within a particular subject matter
or topic of speech, “the government has singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based
on the views expressed.” Id. at 1766; see Frederick Schauer, Not Just About License Plates:
Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Government Speech, and Doctrinal Overlap in the
First Amendment, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 265, 282 (noting that “from the perspective of the First
Amendment’s prohibition on viewpoint discrimination, for government to tell citizens that
they can express one view but not the opposing view is a central violation of the very idea
of freedom of speech”).
131 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1934.
132 As Kavanaugh put it:
It is sometimes said that the bigger the government, the smaller the
individual. Consistent with the text of the Constitution, the state-action
doctrine enforces a critical boundary between the government and the
individual, and thereby protects a robust sphere of individual liberty.
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scholar Stephen Feldman calls the “classical liberal self”133 philosophy, under which
“[t]he absence of government action supposedly equates with individual liberty.”134
Before turning to the Halleck dissent, a closer examination of the state action
doctrine and Jackson is beneficial. A key question is whether Jackson actually sup-
plied the correct rule for determining state action in Halleck. It is a fair query to pose
because the state action doctrine long “has been anything but clear and simple”135
in its application and is, in fact, “notoriously incoherent.”136 As Professors Kimberly
Yuracko and Ronen Avraham recently summed up the problems, “There is no single
on-off switch whereby constitutional scrutiny is triggered or avoided. State action
doctrine is more of a morass—a set of rather loose doctrines and rules that are
highly dependent on the context and consequences of each particular case.”137
Given such doctrinal ambiguity, Halleck provided a crucible for melding a
combustible combination of forces—a state action doctrine “beset by inconsistency
and disagreement”138 and an equally messy First Amendment doctrine139—ripe for
exploitation by jurists seeking to promote their own ideologies. In other words, with
no clear, must-follow path on either the state action or the First Amendment front,
the Justices seemingly could pick and choose principles and cases that would lead
them to outcomes suiting their own values.
Professor Christopher Schmidt asserts that while Jackson’s exclusive-and-
traditional test added precision for determining whether a private entity is perform-
ing a public function and thus becomes a state actor, “it is the very clarity of the
public function test that critics attack for being inadequately responsive to the need
to extend constitutional oversight over activities that, while not necessarily tradition-
ally and exclusively public functions, the government has delegated to private
Expanding the state-action doctrine beyond its traditional boundaries
would expand governmental control while restricting individual liberty
and private enterprise. We decline to do so in this case.
Id.
133 Stephen M. Feldman, Postmodern Free Expression: A Philosophical Rationale for the
Digital Age, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 1123, 1182 (2017).
134 Id.
135 Saidel-Goley & Singer, supra note 15, at 446.
136 Id.; see also Nathan S. Chapman, The Establishment Clause, State Action, and Town
of Greece, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 405, 408 (2015) (noting that “commentators have
largely concluded that the state action doctrine is incoherent”).
137 Kimberly A. Yuracko & Ronen Avraham, Valuing Black Lives: A Constitutional
Challenge to the Use of Race-Based Tables in Calculating Tort Damages, 106 CALIF. L.
REV. 325, 348 (2018).
138 Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1411 (2003).
139 See Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning Means for the
First Amendment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1423, 1478 (2014) (observing that “First Amendment doctrine
and the language games on which it is based are messy and ongoing projects”); see also supra
note 5 (addressing the generally and historically confused state of First Amendment law).
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entities.”140 Indeed, as attorney David Howard observes, Jackson’s public function
test “has been interpreted narrowly, and federal courts generally find that only functions
like holding elections, exercising eminent domain, and operating a company-owned
town, constitute state action.”141
The Halleck majority thus picked a state-action test with a “restrictive definition
of public function,”142 thereby reducing the odds that a private entity will be consid-
ered a state actor. Jackson requires the function in question to have been performed
both traditionally and exclusively by the government.143 This is hard to satisfy, as
the Court acknowledged in Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, because “[w]hile many func-
tions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been ‘exclu-
sively reserved to the State.’”144
There are, however, alternative approaches for finding state action. Indeed,
Jackson more broadly framed the state action question as about “whether there is a
sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated
entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”145
The Court observed the looseness and imprecision of this standard in 2001 in Brent-
wood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n.146 It wrote there that:
What is fairly attributable [to the State] is a matter of normative
judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity. From the range
of circumstances that could point toward the State behind an
individual face, no one fact can function as a necessary condi-
tion across the board for finding state action; nor is any set of
circumstances absolutely sufficient, for there may be some coun-
tervailing reason against attributing activity to the government.147
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky notes that this explication of state action does not
focus on a public function, with the Court in Brentwood Academy instead concen-
trating on “the government’s ‘entwinement’ with the private entity.”148 Writing for the
majority in Brentwood Academy, Justice David Souter used the term “entwinement”149
140 Christopher W. Schmidt, On Doctrinal Confusion: The Case of the State Action Doctrine,
2016 BYU L. REV. 575, 588 (2016).
141 David M. Howard, Rethinking State Inaction: An In-Depth Look at the State Action
Doctrine in State and Lower Federal Courts, 16 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 221, 227–28 (2017).
142 Nat Stern, State Action, Establishment Clause, and Defamation: Blueprints for Civil Liber-
ties in the Rehnquist Court, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1175, 1193 (1989).
143 See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
144 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978).
145 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
146 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
147 Id. at 295–96.
148 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 544 n.54.
149 Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 291.
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in concluding that “a statewide association incorporated to regulate interscholastic
athletic competition among public and private secondary schools”150 should be
treated as a state actor.151 Chemerinsky dubs the decision’s entwinement standard,
which may be distinguished from a related “entanglement” approach to state action,152
“a much more expansive exception to the state action doctrine than found in prior
cases. But the exception is not defined with any precision.”153
What is most relevant from Brentwood Academy for understanding Halleck,
however, is that the Court remarked that it had treated a private entity as a state actor
when the entity was “delegated a public function by the State.”154 The Court in
Brentwood Academy cited its 1988 decision in West v. Atkins155 as standing for this
delegation-of-duties proposition.156 West, in turn, is the case on which the Halleck
dissent hung its decision that MNN was a state actor.157
In West, the Court held that Samuel Atkins, a private physician who had a contract
with the State of North Carolina to supply orthopedic services on a part-time basis
at a state-run prison hospital, was a state actor when he treated inmate Quincy
West.158 The Court found that Atkins’s work in treating West was “fairly attributable
to the State.”159 The fact that Atkins worked on a contractual basis and was not a
state employee made no difference because he still was “authorized and obliged to
treat prison inmates.”160
150 Id. at 290.
151 See id. at 291 (“We hold that the association’s regulatory activity may and should be
treated as state action owing to the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the
structure of the association, there being no offsetting reason to see the association’s acts in
any other way.”).
152 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 542 (noting that the entanglement exception to
the general rule that private entities are not state actors holds “that private conduct must
comply with the Constitution if the government has authorized, encouraged, or facilitated the
unconstitutional conduct”).
153 Id. at 552.
154 Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296.
155 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
156 See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296 (citation omitted).
157 See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1939–40 (2019)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (opining that the conclusion that MNN is a state actor “follows from
the Court’s decision in West v. Atkins”).
158 West, 487 U.S. at 54–58.
159 Id. at 54.
160 Id. at 55. The Court reasoned:
It is the physician’s function within the state system, not the precise
terms of his employment, that determines whether his actions can fairly
be attributed to the State. Whether a physician is on the state payroll or
is paid by contract, the dispositive issue concerns the relationship among
the State, the physician, and the prisoner.
Id. at 55–56.
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The Halleck majority gave short shrift to West. It mentioned West only once,
coming in a footnote.161 There, the majority found that West only applies when the
government outsources a constitutionally mandated obligation to a private entity.162
Justice Kavanaugh explained that in West, North Carolina “was constitutionally ob-
ligated to provide medical care to prison inmates.”163 In particular, the Tar Heel State
had an Eighth Amendment164 obligation to ensure that the medical care it provided
to inmates was not so shoddy or deliberately indifferent as to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.165 For Kavanaugh, West was readily distinguished from Halleck
because in Halleck, the government had no constitutional “obligation to operate
public access channels.”166
The dissent in Halleck pushed back on this cursory effort to confine West to
cases involving the delegation of constitutional obligations. Justice Sotomayor con-
tended that the majority ignored a critical fact in West—namely, that North Carolina
“had no constitutional obligation to open the prison or incarcerate the prisoner in the
first place.”167 The Eighth Amendment obligation regarding proper medical treat-
ment only arose after the state chose to run prisons.168 This, for Justice Sotomayor,
was analogous to the situation in Halleck because New York City
had no constitutional obligation to award a cable franchise or to
operate public-access channels. But once the City did award a
161 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1929 n.1.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment has been incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to apply to the states. Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–68 (1962); see Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp.,
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433–34 (2001) (“Despite the broad discretion that States possess with
respect to the imposition of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits on that
discretion. That Clause makes the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines
and cruel and unusual punishments applicable to the States.”).
165 As the majority put it in West:
Contracting out prison medical care does not relieve the State of its
constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in
its custody, and it does not deprive the State’s prisoners of the means
to vindicate their Eighth Amendment rights. The State bore an affirmative
obligation to provide adequate medical care to West; the State delegated
that function to respondent Atkins; and respondent voluntarily assumed
that obligation by contract.
West, 487 U.S. at 56 (internal citations omitted).
166 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1929 n.1.
167 Id. at 1943 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
168 Id.
886 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:865
cable franchise, New York law required the City to obtain
public-access channels . . . and to open them up as a public
forum . . . . That is when the City’s obligation to act in accordance
with the First Amendment with respect to the channels arose.169
Applying West, the dissent had little difficulty finding that MNN should be
treated as a state actor.170 In brief, by initially concluding that public access channels
are public forums triggering First Amendment concerns, the dissent made the state
action determination easy. It became a simple instance of a state actor (New York
City) farming out its constitutional obligations to a private entity (MNN).171 As Jus-
tice Sotomayor encapsulated it, “The First Amendment does not fall silent simply
because a government hands off the administration of its constitutional duties to a
private actor.”172 Thus, as noted above, the order in which the dissent addressed the
issues was pivotal; by choosing to first resolve the First Amendment public forum
issue, the dissent was able to settle the second issue—the state action question—in
a very different fashion from the majority.173
Finally, just as the Halleck majority articulated why West did not supply the
correct rule,174 so too did the dissent explain why the rule from Jackson, which the
majority embraced, was inapplicable. Jackson, as Sotomayor wrote, applies when
a private entity chooses to enter and do business in a heavily government-regulated
marketplace.175 That is distinct from the factual scenario in Halleck where, as
Sotomayor wrote, MNN took on a “role because it was asked to do so by the City”176
and was “deputized”177 by the City to carry it out. In brief, Jackson applies when a
private company wanders into a heavily regulated field to do business; West applies
when a governmental entity delegates a constitutional responsibility—even one that
it took on, even if it did originally not need to do so—to a private entity.
Perhaps Halleck simply involves dueling stereotypes. If siding with MNN fits
a conservative cliché of embracing individual liberty and attacking big government,178
169 Id. at 1943–44 (internal citations omitted).
170 Id. at 1940–41.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 1941.
173 See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text (addressing the order in which the
dissent treated the issues).
174 See supra notes 161–66 and accompanying text (addressing the majority’s reasoning
on why West was inapplicable).
175 Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1942–43 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1943.
178 See Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment Jurispru-
dence, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 231, 235 (2014) (asserting that “conservative jurisprudence” contains
a strand “which holds that the Constitution should be interpreted to promote a libertarian
conception of individual freedom and to limit the power and functions of the state”).
2020] DISSENT, DISAGREEMENT AND DOCTRINAL DISARRAY 887
as Justice Kavanaugh framed the outcome,179 then ruling in favor of the right of two
local filmmakers to criticize the business practices of MNN in allegedly neglecting
the community of East Harlem fits what might be considered the old-school view
of liberals as champions of the speech rights of the little guy.180
This all merits comparison with a memorable, acrimonious remark from a 2018
Supreme Court First Amendment decision. Specifically, in her dissent on behalf of
the same bloc of four liberal Justices in Janus v. American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees, Elena Kagan accused the conservative majority
of “weaponizing the First Amendment”181 and “using it against workaday economic
and regulatory policy.”182
It might well be said that in Halleck, the conservative majority weaponized the
state action doctrine. It did so to shield the editorial decisions of a business from the
forces of First Amendment doctrine that otherwise would have interfered with its
ability to engage in viewpoint discrimination. Halleck’s bottom line is that the
speech rights (in terms of autonomous editorial control and decision-making) of a
corporate entity—albeit a non-profit one183—prevailed over the speech rights of
individual filmmakers who criticized it. The former’s speech rights triumphed
precisely because the First Amendment did not apply. And by using the state action
doctrine as a weapon to deny the First Amendment’s relevance against a business
entity, the Halleck majority adds support to Dean Chemerinsky’s thesis that the
Roberts Court “is not a free speech Court.”184 It is perhaps more accurate, then, to
say that the Court, as it enters the third decade of the twenty-first century, is a cham-
pion of First Amendment speech rights and First Amendment expansionism when
five conservative Justices want it to be.
II. SPLINTERING ON SPEECH AND PRESS RIGHTS IN NIEVES V. BARTLETT:
A LESSON IN HOW NOT TO CREATE A FEDERAL RULE?
If the nation’s highest appellate body is not necessarily a free speech Court today,185
might it also not be a free press Court? It is a difficult query to resolve head on due
to the paucity of press cases. As Dean Lyrissa Lidsky observed in 2012, “[T]he
Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts has taken up relatively few First
179 Supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
180 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 439, 440 (1995) (“It used to be that censorship was associated with the right and free
speech libertarianism with the left.”).
181 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
182 Id.
183 Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019) (describing
MNN as “a private nonprofit corporation”).
184 Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 734 (2011).
185 Id.
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Amendment cases directly involving the media.”186 In fact, remarking on “the
paucity of press cases before the Court,”187 Lidsky contended that with “such scant
evidence, any predictions about the Roberts Court’s likely path in ‘press cases’ must
be circumspect.”188
Indeed, the prospects for robust constitutional protection of journalists—
seemingly under siege today on multiple fronts189—seem sadly slim. That is be-
cause, as Professors RonNell Andersen Jones and Sonja West recently wrote—in
addressing press freedom in an era when the President of the United States is openly
hostile to journalists—that
the Supreme Court has long been wary of interpreting the First
Amendment’s Press Clause as an active and vibrant defender of
press freedom—at least in any manner that might distinguish it
from the Speech Clause. The Court has repeatedly declared that
the press should not receive any constitutional privileges that are
not equally shared by all speakers, and therefore the constitu-
tional rights the press does enjoy tend to be the same rights that
we all possess.190
Andersen Jones and West argue that rather than narrowly focusing on President
Donald Trump’s repeated antipathy and bellicosity toward the mainstream press,
one must “engage in a broader conversation about the critical roles of the press in
our society, the mechanisms by which we have protected those roles in the past, the
186 Lyrissa Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819, 1819.
187 Id. at 1834.
188 Id.
189 See BRIAN S. BROOKS ET AL., NEWS REPORTING & WRITING, at v (13th ed. 2020) (“The
constant partisan attacks on the press at the national level roll like an avalanche down to the
smallest news outlet. Trust in the media has suffered from the toxic atmosphere. Journalists
are subjected to verbal and sometimes physical abuse.”); Lili Levi, The Weaponized Lawsuit
Against the Media: Litigation Funding as a New Threat to Journalism, 66 AM. U. L. REV.
761, 763 (2017) (“From Donald Trump’s vituperative threats against the press during the
2016 presidential election, to judicial distaste for modern journalistic practices, to declining
public esteem for a self-sabotaging press, news organizations today are facing a war against
the media.” (internal citations omitted)).
190 RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The Fragility of the Free American Press,
112 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 573 (2017). Professor West elaborates in another article that:
The Supreme Court occasionally offers up rhetoric on the value of the
free press, but it steadfastly refuses to explicitly recognize any right or
protection as emanating solely from the Press Clause. Because the free-
doms to publish and to disseminate speech are also protected by the
Speech Clause, the Press Clause has been left with nothing to do.
Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1028 (2011) (internal
citations omitted).
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potential impact of underprotecting newsgatherers, and how we can best preserve
our free and independent press.”191 One of those critical roles, of course, is for the
press to be a watchdog on government officials,192 functioning “as a powerful
antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials.”193 This watchdog role
sometimes is called the checking value of a free press.194 Other roles for the press
in serving the public, as Andersen Jones notes in a more recent article, include
“informing, contextualizing, narrating, and educating.”195
How the Roberts Court feels about the press and the multiple tasks it performs
is finally coming into view, even if just partially so. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme
Court in May 2019 decided Nieves v. Bartlett.196 The ruling directly impacts the
rights of not just mainstream and professional members of the press,197 but also so-
called citizen journalists.198 These latter individuals, sometimes armed with nothing
191 Andersen Jones & West, supra note 190, at 595.
192 See Jonathan Mermin, Free But Not Independent: The Real First Amendment Issue for
the Press, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 929, 929 (2005) (“A fundamental tenet of our First Amendment
tradition is that the press does not simply report what public officials say, but acts instead as
a ‘watchdog’ over the government.”).
193 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
194 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 527 (1977) (observing the value that a free press “can serve in checking the abuse
of power by public officials,” and noting the then-recent impact of the First Amendment “on
American life by facilitating a process by which countervailing forces check the misuse of
official power”).
195 RonNell Andersen Jones, Press Speakers and the First Amendment Rights of Listeners,
90 U. COLO. L. REV. 499, 527 (2019).
196 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019).
197 See Steen Steensen, Cozy Journalism: The Rise of Social Cohesion as an Ideal in
Online, Participatory Journalism, 5 JOURNALISM PRAC. 687, 688 (2011) (asserting that “profes-
sional ideology becomes what separates the journalist from the blogger, the press agent, the
spin-doctor and other professionals and non-professionals, who select, interpret, frame and
distribute information to an audience,” and adding that “ideas like independence, objectivity,
and accuracy, have been portrayed as vital to the professional ideology of journalism”).
198 See D. Jasun Carr et al., Cynics and Skeptics: Evaluating the Credibility of Mainstream
and Citizen Journalism, 91 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 452, 454 (2014) (asserting that
a “narrow definition of citizen journalism focuses on the reporting of newsworthy events,
usually disasters or crises (events that the mainstream media cannot predict), typically using
new media technologies, and often before the mainstream media arrive on the scene,” while
a “broader definition of citizen journalism includes a range of information gathering and report-
ing activities, such as blogging (or microblogging) and image sharing, as well as reporting
breaking news” (internal citations omitted)); Sue Robinson & Cathy Deshano, Citizen Journal-
ists and Their Third Places: What Makes People Exchange Information Online (or Not)?,
12 JOURNALISM STUD. 642, 643 (2011) (asserting that citizen journalism “is used pervasively
to describe everyone from bloggers to those who merely contribute to news forums”); see also
Clay Calvert & Mirelis Torres, Putting the Shock Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence:
When Freedom for the Citizen-Journalist Watchdog Trumps the Right of Informational Pri-
vacy on the Internet, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 323, 342 (2011) (“Generally, the term
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but smartphones, also perform as watchdogs holding government actors, including
police, accountable for their actions in the true spirit of the Free Press Clause.199
For instance, a twenty-three-year-old barber named Feidin Santana used his
smartphone in April 2015 to perform a “vital journalistic function.”200 In particular,
Santana recorded video in North Charleston, South Carolina, of a white police
officer, Michael T. Slager, shooting in the back and killing a fleeing, unarmed black
man, Walter L. Scott.201 It was simply a recent example of the power of video to
reveal alleged police malfeasance. George Holliday’s 1991 video of Los Angeles
police officers beating Rodney King with batons provides an older reminder of the
watchdog role that everyday citizens can play in exposing incidents of government
officials seemingly abusing their positions of power.202 Indeed, as one scholar notes,
“few would remember the name of Rodney King had it not been for the video of a
citizen journalist who left an indelible imprint on American racial consciousness.”203
Multiple federal appellate courts, in fact, now give constitutional support to such
acts of citizen journalism by recognizing a qualified First Amendment right to
record police performing their duties in public venues.204 Indeed, in the course of
recognizing such a right to record, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
remarked in 2017 that it was joining “this growing consensus.”205
citizen-journalism refers to the increasingly frequent activity among common citizens—amateur
journalists—of gathering news and disseminating information to the general public, and
contrasts with what might be called old journalism.”).
199 See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (asserting that “[t]he press plays
a unique role as a check on government abuse,” and adding that the press serves a key role
“as a watchdog of government activity”); see also Ricardo G. Fernández-Martínez, The
Spontaneous Video and Its Impact on the Digital Press, 32 COMM. & SOC’Y 213, 213 (2019)
(noting that “[c]urrent mobile technology has resulted in a boom in citizen journalism and
video activism as, thanks to online communications and web 2.0 applications, a video can
now be shared within seconds”).
200 Clay Calvert, The First Amendment Right to Record Images of Police in Public Places:
The Unreasonable Slipperiness of Reasonableness & Possible Paths Forward, 3 TEX. A&M
L. REV. 131, 132 (2015) (citation omitted).
201 Id. at 132–33.
202 See CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN MODERN
CULTURE 5 (2000) (describing the Holliday video).
203 Nicole Maurantonio, Remembering Rodney King: Myth, Racial Reconciliation, and
Civil Rights History, 91 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 740, 751 (2014).
204 See Clay Calvert, The Right to Record Images of Police in Public Places: Should
Intent, Viewpoint, or Journalistic Status Determine First Amendment Protection?, 64 UCLA
L. REV. DISC. 230, 237–38 (2016) (citations omitted) (addressing appellate court rulings on
this issue); Howard M. Wasserman, Police Misconduct, Video Recording, and Procedural
Barriers to Rights Enforcement, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1313, 1319 (2018) (noting that six federal
appellate courts “have recognized a First Amendment right for members of the public to
record police and other public officials performing their public functions in public spaces”).
205 Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 356 (3d Cir. 2017).
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So, how is Nieves relevant here? Imagine that a journalist, be she of either the pro-
fessional or common citizen variety, is arrested. The arrest ostensibly is for violating
a lawful order to stand back further, supposedly for both her own safety and that of
police officers, on a public sidewalk. The sidewalk is located immediately adjacent
to a street where several officers are arresting dozens of protestors for blocking
traffic. The journalist, however, claims she was arrested not because she did anything
wrong, but because she exercised her qualified First Amendment right to record
video of the officers making the arrests, which she perceived as physically abusive.
If she files a Section 1983 claim206 alleging she was arrested in retaliation for
exercising her First Amendment rights of speech and press, then she initially must
clear the new federal rule fashioned in Nieves, as described earlier.207 Specifically,
she would need to prove either that there was no probable cause to arrest her or, if
probable cause existed, that it also existed to arrest similarly situated individuals who
were not arrested and who were not engaged in the same First Amendment–protected
activity of recording police.208 The majority added that both facets of this new rule
involve purely objective inquiries, under which “the statements and motivations of
the particular arresting officer are ‘irrelevant.’”209 The latter half of the rule—the
exception to the general principle that a plaintiff must prove there was no probable
cause to arrest—is objective because it focuses on comparing the plaintiff to others:
Were there others similarly situated to the plaintiff, but who were not engaged in the
same First Amendment–protected activity and who were not arrested?210 Only if the
plaintiff clears the Nieves rule can her claim proceed to the next steps set forth by
the Court in Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle for a successful First Amend-
ment retaliation claim.211
206 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (addressing Section 1983 claims).
207 See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text (describing the rule from Nieves).
208 See Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019) (concluding that while “probable
cause should generally defeat a retaliatory arrest claim,” a plaintiff need not prove the absence
of probable cause to win when he “presents objective evidence that he was arrested when
otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had
not been”).
209 Id. (quoting Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004)).
210 Id.
211 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Under the Mt. Healthy test, a plaintiff carries the initial burden
of showing that her exercise of a constitutionally protected right was a substantial or moti-
vating factor for the negative action taken against her by a government actor. Id. If the
plaintiff can demonstrate this, then she will win unless the government actor can prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the negative action would have been taken against the
plaintiff regardless of whether she was exercising a constitutionally protected right. Id. In
brief, the Mt. Healthy test involves burden shifting. See Frank D. LoMonte & Clay Calvert,
The Open Mic, Unplugged: Challenges to Viewpoint-Based Constraints on Public-Comment
Periods, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19, 59–60 (2018) (noting that the Mt. Healthy test “initially
imposes burdens on the plaintiff. Only if the plaintiff satisfies those hurdles does the burden
eventually shift to the government” (internal citation omitted)).
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Regardless of one’s beliefs about either the value of videotape to expose the
truth or the merits of the difficult-to-define concept of citizen journalism,212 the
Nieves rule is both journalistically and constitutionally important. That is because
“participatory cultures, which now enable citizens to become the collectors and
disseminators of news, have become important influences on news operations.”213
Yet, one of the most remarkable and disappointing things (from a free press–advocacy
perspective) about Nieves is that only two Justices—Ruth Bader Ginsburg214 and
Sonia Sotomayor215—even mentioned the possible detrimental impact on the press
of the Court’s newly minted rule in First Amendment–based retaliatory arrest cases.
Furthermore, only Sotomayor addressed its likely negative consequences on, in her
words, a “citizen journalist.”216 In doing so, Sotomayor articulated a seemingly not
so far-fetched hypothetical in which a citizen journalist is arrested for trespassing
after using a phone to stream video on a social media platform of a heated encounter
between police and an individual who might be a neighborhood prowler.217
In brief, Nieves reveals two problems for First Amendment jurisprudence. The
first trouble, as described in the Introduction, is the disunity among the Justices in
fashioning a federal rule affecting First Amendment rights.218 The second problem,
as noted immediately above, is that a mere two Justices squarely addressed the
implications of the rule on journalists, with the rest missing a prime opportunity to
contextualize the rule within the framework of the Free Press Clause.219 The remain-
der of this Part of the Article addresses these two problems.
Regarding the lack of unity in fashioning the Nieves rule, four Justices wrote
separate opinions, each complaining in some fashion about certain aspects of the
212 See Seth C. Lewis et al., Thinking About Citizen Journalism: The Philosophical and
Practical Challenges of User-Generated Content for Community Newspapers, 4 JOURNALISM
PRAC. 163, 166 (2010) (asserting that “citizen journalism can be hard to define”).
213 Melissa Wall, Change the Space, Change the Practice?: Re-Imagining Journalism
Education with the Pop-Up Newsroom, 9 JOURNALISM PRAC. 123, 123 (2015).
214 See Nieves, 139 S. Ct. 1734–35 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting
in part) (concluding that she “would not use this thin case to state a rule that will leave press
members and others exercising First Amendment rights with little protection against police
suppression of their speech” (emphasis added)).
215 See id. at 1741 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (questioning the impact on “a reporter [who]
is investigating corruption in a police unit” due to the majority’s holding that statements of
arresting officers are irrelevant under the new rule’s exception to the general requirement that
a plaintiff must prove there was no probable cause to arrest).
216 Id. at 1740.
217 Id.
218 See supra notes 50–66 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the opinions
of four Justices—Thomas, Gorsuch, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor—who wrote opinions in Nieves
that were critical of the majority’s new rule in some manner).
219 See supra notes 214–17 and accompanying text (noting how only Justices Ginsburg
and Sotomayor directly addressed the possible deleterious ramifications of the Nieves rule
on journalists).
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new standard.220 Before examining the frets and quibbles of those Justices, it helps
to appraise the disharmony in Nieves by comparing it to other cases in which the
Court adopted a federal rule affecting the First Amendment rights of speech and/or
press. As suggested below, it is possible to generate a durable, long-lasting rule even
if some Justices on the Court that initially adopted it vented disagreements.
Most notably, in the 1964 defamation case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
Justice William Brennan wrote for the Court that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments required adopting
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official con-
duct unless he proves that the statement was made with “actual
malice”—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not.221
Significantly, in embracing the actual malice rule as a fault standard,222 not all
of the Justices agreed about its soundness. In a concurrence joined by William
Douglas, Hugo Black complained that actual malice was poorly defined and would
be hard to prove and disprove.223 He also lamented that actual malice “provides at best
an evanescent protection for the right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly
does not measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment.”224 In
brief, although Black agreed with the outcome reversing a libel judgment for plaintiff
L.B. Sullivan and against the New York Times, he thought that actual malice, as a
federal rule, did not go far enough in protecting First Amendment interests.225
Justice Arthur Goldberg also wrote a concurrence joined by Douglas.226 As with
Justice Black, Goldberg believed the actual malice rule failed to afford sufficient safe-
guards for critics of public officials’ conduct.227 All totaled, three Justices in New York
220 Supra notes 50–66 and accompanying text.
221 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
222 See Derigan Silver & Ruth Walden, A Dangerous Distinction: The Deconstitutional-
ization of Private Speech, 21 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 59, 63 (2012) (“The Court labeled this
fault standard ‘actual malice.’”).
223 N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring).
224 Id.
225 See id. (“Unlike the Court, therefore, I vote to reverse exclusively on the ground that the
Times and the individual defendants had an absolute, unconditional constitutional right to pub-
lish in the Times advertisement their criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials.”).
226 Id. at 297 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
227 See id. at 298 (reasoning “that the Constitution affords greater protection than that pro-
vided by the Court’s standard to citizen and press in exercising the right of public criticism,”
and concluding that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution afford to the
citizen and to the press an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite
the harm which may flow from excesses and abuses”).
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Times Co.—Black, Goldberg, and Douglas—thought that actual malice was a prob-
lematic rule and did not provide enough protection to First Amendment interests.228
When the actual malice rule was extended in 1967 to apply to public figures (not
just public officials) in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,229 the Court was even more
fractured on its applicability. As the Court later explained, the actual malice rule was
extended by Curtis Publishing not in the Court’s opinion delivered by Justice John
Marshall Harlan,230 but rather by Chief Justice Earl Warren in a concurrence joined in
key parts by four other Justices.231 The Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. sorted out
the tortuous path in Curtis through which actual malice came to apply to public figures:
Chief Justice Warren stated the principle . . . that the New York
Times test reaches both public figures and public officials. . . .
Brennan and . . . White agreed with the Chief Justice on that
question. . . . Black and . . . Douglas reiterated their view that
publishers should have an absolute immunity from liability for
defamation, but they acquiesced in the Chief Justice’s reasoning
in order to enable a majority of the Justices to agree on the
question of the appropriate constitutional privilege for defama-
tion of public figures.232
Despite such early hiccups, the actual malice rule lives on decades later as the
fault standard for both public official and public figure plaintiffs in defamation
cases. Although Justice Clarence Thomas recently expressed disagreement with its
extension to public figures,233 the actual malice rule seems unlikely to be jettisoned
228 Both Justices Black and Goldberg called for adopting an absolute rule of protection.
See id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring) (concluding “that the Times and the individual defendants
had an absolute, unconditional constitutional right to publish in the Times advertisement their
criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials”); id. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(“For these reasons, I strongly believe that the Constitution accords citizens and press an
unconditional freedom to criticize official conduct.”).
229 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
230 In delivering the judgments of the Court in Curtis Publishing and its companion case
of Associated Press v. Walker, Justice Harlan issued a plurality opinion that was joined only
by three other Justices (Tom Clark, Potter Stewart and Abe Fortas). Id. at 133. Harlan called
for a federal rule under which public figures would need to prove “highly unreasonable con-
duct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.” Id. at 155.
231 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 (1974) (noting that while Harlan
announced the result in Curtis Publishing and its companion case of Associated Press v.
Walker, “a majority of the Court agreed with Mr. Chief Justice Warren’s conclusion that the
New York Times test should apply to criticism of ‘public figures’ as well as ‘public officials’”).
232 Id. at 336 n.7.
233 In early 2019, Justice Thomas derided New York Times Co.’s adoption of the actual malice
rule and later Supreme Court decisions extending its reach to other scenarios as “policy-driven
2020] DISSENT, DISAGREEMENT AND DOCTRINAL DISARRAY 895
by the Court anytime in the near future.234 In fact, the Court extended it in 1988 from
the realm of defamation law to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED) in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.235 Of the eight Justices who participated in
Falwell, only one—Byron White—expressed a mild problem with extending actual
malice from New York Times Co. and libel to IIED.236
More recently, the Court in Snyder v. Phelps seemed to adopt another First
Amendment–based rule in the realm of tort law.237 It held there that speech “at a
public place on a matter of public concern”238 receives “‘special protection’ under
the First Amendment”239 against tort causes of action. That broad rule precluded Albert
Snyder, a private-figure plaintiff, from recovering under the tort theories of IIED
and intrusion into seclusion, as well as civil conspiracy theories related thereto.240
decisions masquerading as constitutional law.” McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari). Thomas’s concern, particularly as it involves
stretching actual malice’s application from public-official plaintiffs to public-figure plaintiffs,
is that “[n]one of these decisions made a sustained effort to ground their holdings in the Con-
stitution’s original meaning.” Id. at 678. As Thomas explained, “[t]here are sound reasons
to question whether either the First or Fourteenth Amendment, as originally understood, en-
compasses an actual-malice standard for public figures or otherwise displaces vast swaths
of state defamation law.” Id. at 680. He ultimately concluded that “[w]e should reconsider
our jurisprudence in this area.” Id. at 682.
234 Lower courts, in fact, are now starting to wrestle with Thomas’s attack on the actual
malice rule in McKee. For instance, in May 2019, U.S. Magistrate Gordon Gallagher rejected
the plaintiffs’ argument that, based on Thomas’s opinion in McKee, Gallagher should consider
if “[New York Times Co.] sets an impossible standard, thus displacing the possibility of proving
up a mere negligence claim.” Anderson v. Colo. Mountain News Media Co., No. 18-cv-029
34-CMA-GPG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135665, at *27 (D. Colo. May 20, 2019). Magistrate
Gallagher bluntly rebuffed this contention. See id. (“This Court declines the invitation to over-
turn a half-century of Supreme Court jurisprudence.”).
235 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). The Court wrote there that:
public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as
the one here at issue without showing in addition that the publication
contains a false statement of fact which was made with “actual malice,”
i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard
as to whether or not it was true.
Id.
236 See id. at 57 (White, J., concurring) (“As I see it, the decision in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan . . . has little to do with this case, for here the jury found that the ad contained no
assertion of fact.” (internal citations omitted)).
237 The word “seemed” is strategically used in this sentence because, in penning the majority
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts asserted that “[o]ur holding today is narrow. We are required
in First Amendment cases to carefully review the record, and the reach of our opinion here
is limited by the particular facts before us.” 562 U.S. 443, 460 (2011).
238 Id. at 458.
239 Id.
240 See id. at 460 (“Because we find that the First Amendment bars Snyder from recovery
for intentional infliction of emotional distress or intrusion upon seclusion—the alleged
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In Phelps, only one Justice—Samuel Alito—openly disagreed with this rule, at least
to the extent that it applies to private-figure plaintiffs.241 Justice Breyer, in a solo
concurrence, also expressed reservations about extending the rule to all situations
involving private-figure plaintiffs.242
The bottom line is that venerable federal rules affecting the First Amendment—
especially the actual malice rule—are not always born out of unanimity among the
Justices. Thus, the mere fact that there was disagreement in Nieves over the rule it
created does not mean that its future is doomed or destined to be short lived.
The problem in Nieves, however, is significantly different from that in New York
Times Co., which spawned the actual malice rule. In New York Times Co., the dis-
sension was not over whether there should be a federal rule or how that federal rule
should be created. The rift simply was over whether the rule (actual malice) went far
enough in protecting the press; six Justices believed it did, while three Justices
thought it should have bestowed more protection.243
In Nieves, not only were more Justices—four—in disagreement about all or part
of the rule than in New York Times Co., but their concerns ran deeper than just whether
a rule went far enough in protecting First Amendment interests. Justice Thomas’s
primary objection to the exception or qualification facet of Nieves’s general rule that
a plaintiff must prove a lack of probable cause was that it “has no basis in either the
common law or our First Amendment precedents.”244 Without such precedent, Thomas
complained that the Court was crafting the “exception as a matter of policy.”245
Indeed, Thomas clearly objects to the Court creating federal rules as a matter of
policy. Earlier in 2019 and prior to Nieves, Thomas expressed his objection to both
the creation of the actual malice rule in New York Times Co. and its later extension
to public-figure plaintiffs as “policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional
law.”246 He bluntly wrote in McKee v. Cosby that “[w]e should not continue to
reflexively apply this policy-driven approach to the Constitution.”247 Instead, when
fashioning federal rules affecting free speech or press, the Court “should carefully
unlawful activity Westboro conspired to accomplish—we must likewise hold that Snyder cannot
recover for civil conspiracy based on those torts.”).
241 See id. at 473 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I would therefore hold that, in this setting, the
First Amendment permits a private figure to recover for the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress caused by speech on a matter of private concern.”).
242 See id. at 462 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“As I understand the Court’s opinion, it does
not hold or imply that the State is always powerless to provide private individuals with
necessary protection.”).
243 See supra notes 223–28 and accompanying text (addressing disagreement with the
actual malice rule in New York Times Co.).
244 Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1728 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, con-
curring in judgment).
245 Id. at 1729.
246 McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 (2019).
247 Id.
2020] DISSENT, DISAGREEMENT AND DOCTRINAL DISARRAY 897
examine the original meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”248 This
neatly comports with the common perception of Thomas as “an avowed originalist.”249
In the absence of identifying a rationale in the original meaning of those amendments
for creating a federal rule, Thomas believes it should be left to state legislative
bodies to fashion those rules.250
In brief, Thomas’s discontent, as evidenced in Nieves, centers on the proper
foundation or grounding for creating federal rules affecting the First Amendment.
Fashioning federal rules as a matter of policy in the absence of historical precedent
is, for him, misguided.
Furthermore, and unlike the three Justices in New York Times Co. who objected
to the actual malice rule,251 Thomas’s concern was not whether the Nieves rule went
far enough in protecting First Amendment interests. In fact, it was quite the oppo-
site. Thomas contended that “the majority’s rule risks chilling law enforcement
officers from making arrests for fear of liability, thus flouting the reasoning behind
the emphasis on probable cause in arrest-based torts at common law.”252 He also
worried that this exception, which helps plaintiffs who cannot prove the absence of
probable cause, was “overbroad”253 because it might apply to “all offenses, includ-
ing serious felonies.”254 In other words, if there is going to be an exception to help
plaintiffs prevail in First Amendment–based retaliatory arrest cases, then it should
be cabined to only individuals arrested for less serious crimes.
Justice Gorsuch expressed multiple concerns with the Nieves rule. These
included: (1) whether it was the proper role for the Court to fashion a definitive no-
probable-cause federal rule in Section 1983 retaliatory arrest actions;255 (2) whether
melding a Fourth Amendment probable cause rule onto a First Amendment–based
claim for retaliatory arrest even makes sense in the first place, given that the two
amendments protect very different interests;256 and (3) whether Nieves, as briefed
248 Id.
249 Derigan Silver & Dan V. Kozlowski, The First Amendment Originalism of Justices
Brennan, Scalia and Thomas, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 385, 408 (2012); see also Heidi Kitrosser,
Interpretive Modesty, 104 GEO. L.J. 459, 471 (2016) (describing Justice Thomas, along with
the late Justice Antonin Scalia, as “two of originalism’s highest profile advocates”).
250 McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 682 (“We did not begin meddling in this area until 1964, nearly
175 years after the First Amendment was ratified. The States are perfectly capable of striking
an acceptable balance between encouraging robust public discourse and providing a mean-
ingful remedy for reputational harm.”).
251 Supra notes 223–28 and accompanying text.
252 Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1729–30 (2019).
253 Id. at 1729.
254 Id.
255 As Justice Gorsuch put it, “Maybe it would be good policy to graft a no-probable-cause
requirement onto the statute, as the officers insist; or maybe not. Either way, that’s an appeal
better directed to Congress than to this Court. Our job isn’t to write or revise legislative policy
but to apply it faithfully.” Id. at 1730 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
256 Gorsuch pointed out that “the First Amendment operates independently of the Fourth
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and argued, provided the proper vehicle for resolving the relationship between
probable cause and First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims.257 For Justice Gorsuch,
it was simply enough in Nieves to more loosely conclude that a plaintiff does not
always need to prove the absence of probable cause to arrest to win a First Amend-
ment retaliatory claim and, concomitantly, a finding that there is probable cause will
not always provide a defense to the arresting officer or officers.258 It was sufficient
for Gorsuch, as he put it in suggesting the Court engaged in judicial overreach by
creating a federal rule when it was not asked to do so, “to resolve the question on
which we did grant certiorari—whether ‘probable cause defeats . . . a First Amend-
ment retaliatory-arrest claim under §1983.’”259 Answering it with the words “no, not
always” seemingly would have done the trick for him.
For Justice Ginsburg, the problem was not merely that creating a new federal
rule was unnecessary,260 but also that the rule the Nieves majority invented was also
harmful to First Amendment speech and press interests.261 She also questioned
whether Nieves even supplied the right vehicle for creating a federal standard, calling
it a “thin case.”262
Finally, Justice Sotomayor penned a dissent that—unlike the opinions of
Thomas, Gorsuch, and Ginsburg—did not concur with any aspect of the majority’s
and provides different protections. It seeks not to ensure lawful authority to arrest but to
protect the freedom of speech.” Id. at 1731 (emphasis omitted). He elaborated:
Like a Fourteenth Amendment selective arrest claim, a First Amendment
retaliatory arrest claim serves a different purpose than a Fourth Amend-
ment unreasonable arrest claim, and that purpose does not depend on
the presence or absence of probable cause. We thus have no legitimate
basis for engrafting a no-probable-cause requirement onto a First
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.
Id. at 1732.
257 See id. at 1734 (“But rather than attempt to sort out precisely when and how probable
cause plays a role in First Amendment claims, I would reserve decision on those questions
until they are properly presented to this Court and we can address them with the benefit of
full adversarial testing.”).
258 See id. (“I would hold, as the majority does, that the absence of probable cause is not
an absolute requirement of such a claim and its presence is not an absolute defense.”).
259 Id.
260 As noted earlier, Justice Ginsburg would have applied the traditional Mt. Healthy test
without adding a threshold layer—what now is the Nieves rule—to it. See supra note 59 and
accompanying text. As she explained the Mt. Healthy test, “The plaintiff bears the burden
of demonstrating that unconstitutional animus was a motivating factor for an adverse action;
the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that, even without any impetus to
retaliate, the defendant would have taken the action complained of.” Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at
1735 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
261 See id. (contending that the majority’s rule “will leave press members and others
exercising First Amendment rights with little protection against police suppression of their
speech”).
262 Id.
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decision.263 Sotomayor ultimately agreed with Justice Ginsburg that Mt. Healthy
already provides the correct approach to First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims,
thereby negating the need for creating a new federal rule in Nieves.264 In the process,
she blasted the Nieves rule for: (1) being unclear;265 (2) relying only on objective and
comparative evidence and rejecting direct statements by officers that might be more
relevant to illicit motives to arrest;266 and (3) selling short the important First
Amendment interests that must be balanced against those of law enforcement under
the Fourth Amendment.267
263 Justices Thomas, Gorsuch and Ginsburg each concurred with some facet of the majority
opinion. See id. at 1728 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment); id. at 1730
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 1734 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the
judgment in part, dissenting in part).
264 Id. at 1742 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
265 See id. at 1741 (“What exactly the Court means by ‘objective evidence,’ ‘otherwise
similarly situated,’ and ‘the same sort of protected speech’ is far from clear.”).
266 Id. at 1738–40. She encapsulated the problem, writing, “[T]he majority suggests that
comparison-based evidence is the sole gateway through the probable-cause barrier that it
otherwise erects. Such evidence can be prohibitively difficult to come by in other selective-
enforcement contexts, and it may be even harder for retaliatory arrest plaintiffs to muster.”
Id. at 1740.
In criticizing the majority’s rejection of direct statements by police officers as evidence
of the reasons for their actions, Justice Sotomayor managed to land a glancing verbal blow
to the Court’s ruling just one year earlier in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), against a same-sex couple’s right to have a baker
make them a cake celebrating their wedding. Specifically, she cited Masterpiece Cakeshop
immediately after the following statement: “The Court’s decision to cast aside evidence of
the arresting officer’s own statements is puzzling. . . . In other contexts, when the ultimate
question is why a decisionmaker took a particular action, the Court considers the decision-
maker’s own statements (favorable or not) to be highly relevant evidence.” Id. at 1739 (in-
ternal citation omitted). In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the majority focused on a statement made
by a member of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission that helped the majority to conclude
that the Commission was hostile to the cake baker’s religion and that the baker thus did not
receive a fair hearing regarding whether he unlawfully discriminated against the same-sex
couple. Id. at 1729–30. Justice Sotomayor joined a dissenting opinion authored by Justice
Ginsburg in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Id. at 1748 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). That dissent ques-
tioned the authoritative relevance and persuasive power of statements made by Commission
members. See id. at 1751 (“Whatever one may think of the statements in historical context,
I see no reason why the comments of one or two Commissioners should be taken to
overcome [the baker’s] refusal to sell a wedding cake to [the couple].”).
267 Sotomayor explained her thinking on this last problem:
The power to constrain a person’s liberty is delegated to law enforcement
officers by the public in a sacred trust. The First Amendment stands as a
bulwark of that trust, erected by people who knew from personal experi-
ence the dangers of abuse that follow from investing anyone with such
awesome power. . . . Because the majority shortchanges that hard-earned
wisdom in the name of marginal convenience, I respectfully dissent.
Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1742 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
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On the latter two of these three points, Sotomayor intimated that adopting an ob-
jective rule of proof (rather than one examining direct statements of law enforcement
officers and other subjective indicators of malicious intent to arrest),268 simply because
it might reduce frivolous lawsuits against officers or be more convenient to them,
unnecessarily and incorrectly tilts the balance between the First Amendment rights of
plaintiffs and the interests of officers.269 Put more bluntly, sacrificing First Amendment
rights at the altar of police convenience and expeditious litigation is imprudent.
Justice Sotomayor’s expressed fear was with the “ill-intentioned officer”270—she gra-
ciously dubbed those of this ilk “rare”271—who might “openly and unabashedly”272
violate the First Amendment rights of citizens.
Her trepidation in Nieves comes as no surprise. Sotomayor’s concern tracks her
prior worries about law enforcement abuses of power in cases such as Utah v.
Strieff.273 The Court there held that evidence seized following an unlawful investiga-
tory stop of a suspicionless individual was nonetheless admissible.274 The evidence
was not excludable, the majority reasoned, because the officer, after stopping the
individual, learned of a valid arrest warrant on the individual and seized the evi-
dence while searching him incident to arrest on that warrant.275 Justice Sotomayor’s
unease with police using post hoc, pretextual justifications to validate unlawful stops
of otherwise suspicionless individuals276—in particular, minorities—was palpable.277
268 See id. at 1738–39 (“But by rejecting direct evidence of unconstitutional motives in
favor of more convoluted comparative proof, the majority’s standard proposes to ration First
Amendment protection in an illogical manner.”).
269 On this point, Justice Sotomayor elaborated:
As for the risk of litigating dubious claims, the Court pays too high a
price to avoid what may well be a marginal inconvenience. Prevailing
First Amendment standards have long governed retaliatory arrest cases
in the Ninth Circuit, and experience there suggests that trials in these
cases are rare—the parties point to only a handful of cases that have
reached trial in more than a decade. . . . Even accepting that, every so
often, a police officer who made a legitimate arrest might have to explain
that arrest to a jury, that is insufficient reason to curtail the First Amend-
ment. No legal standard bats a thousand, and district courts already pos-
sess helpful tools to minimize the burdens of litigation in cases alleging
constitutionally improper motives.
Id. at 1737–38 (internal citations omitted).
270 Id. at 1739.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
274 Id. at 2059 (majority opinion).
275 Id.
276 See id. at 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“This case involves a suspicionless stop,
one in which the officer initiated this chain of events without justification.”).
277 See id. at 2069 (“This Court has allowed an officer to stop you for whatever reason he
wants—so long as he can point to a pretextual justification after the fact.”).
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She called it “no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of this type
of scrutiny.”278 Sotomayor wrote “that unlawful police stops corrode all our civil
liberties and threaten all our lives.”279
It is clear that, for Justice Sotomayor, the First Amendment’s freedoms of speech
and press are especially important because they can be utilized to expose police
impermissibly exploiting their Fourth Amendment powers to arrest. Specifically, she
stressed the importance of video captured by smartphones and news organizations
in providing probative evidence of wrongful arrests.280 She was concerned with the
possibility that a “citizen journalist” who films police would lose his or her protection
under the back-half of the Nieves rule because of its narrow focus on comparative
evidence when such evidence might not exist.281 As Sotomayor concluded in her
dissent, the First Amendment provides a “bulwark” of defense against police officers
who may abuse the “sacred trust” conferred to them by the public to make arrests
fairly and honestly.282 In brief, Sotomayor heartedly embraces the watchdog function
of the press when it comes to protecting individuals against arrests that may violate
their Fourth Amendment rights.283
To summarize, the fracturing in Nieves over adoption of a federal rule was much
more complex than it was in New York Times Co. In New York Times Co., it was simply
a matter of three Justices contending that the Court should have gone much further
than the actual malice rule in safeguarding First Amendment interests.284 In other
words, every Justice in New York Times Co. agreed with a pivotal, foundational
premise: A First Amendment rule was needed to provide a fortress of protection
from civil liability for defamation for individuals and journalists who dare to criti-
cize the conduct of government officials.285 The New York Times Co. Justices only
differed as to whether the actual malice rule satisfactorily served this premise.
In stark contrast, the concerns in Nieves ranged from: (1) establishing the criteria
necessary to create a federal rule protecting First Amendment interests;286 (2) to
278 Id. at 2070.
279 Id. at 2071.
280 Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1739–40 (2019).
281 Id. at 1740.
282 Id. at 1742.
283 See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text (addressing the watchdog function).
284 See supra notes 223–28 and accompanying text (addressing the views of the three
Justices in New York Times Co. who thought actual malice was the incorrect rule to apply).
285 As Justice William Brennan wrote for the Court in New York Times Co., “[W]e consider
this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
286 See supra notes 244–54 and accompanying text (addressing Justice Thomas’s qualms
about creating federal rules in the name of policy concerns and in the absence of any
historical precedent or original understanding of the First Amendment).
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whether a new federal rule was even necessary;287 (3) to whether the new rule went
too far (instead of not going far enough, as in New York Times Co.) in protecting
First Amendment values;288 (4) to whether the issue of creating a definitive federal
rule regarding the relationship between probable cause and First Amendment re-
taliatory arrest claims was adequately teed up and addressed by the parties in Nieves.289
Such dissension is, to put it mildly, less than optimal for producing a hearty and
enduring federal rule that affects not only speech rights, but also—as described
above290 and encapsulated immediately below—the rarely considered rights of the
mainstream press and citizen journalists.
As noted earlier, both Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor fretted over the deleteri-
ous effects of the Nieves291 rule on the press. Ginsburg, in fact, opened her opinion
by citing multiple lower court decisions acknowledging that the police power to
arrest “can be abused to disrupt the exercise of First Amendment speech and press
rights.”292 She wrapped up her opinion by asserting that the Nieves rule “will leave
press members and others exercising First Amendment rights with little protection
against police suppression of their speech.”293 In a nutshell, two Justices vigorously
voiced complaints regarding the looming, journalism-menacing ramifications of
Nieves on a free press—a press that, at least for Sotomayor, encompasses within its
ambit, the average citizen journalist.294 That is tremendous news for free-press advo-
cates. It also provides a glimpse into how two of the current Justices feel about the
significance of a free press in a democratic society.
The negative flipside, however, is that two out of nine Justices constitutes less
than twenty-five percent of the Court’s composition. Seven Justices did not directly
mention the impact of the Nieves rule on either journalists or the press. To his credit,
Justice Gorsuch noted the importance of the First Amendment (although not specifi-
cally the significance of journalists or the press) in a free society.295
287 See supra notes 59, 264 and accompanying text (addressing the conclusions of both
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor that there was no need to create a new test in Nieves
because Mt. Healthy already supplied the correct balancing and burden-shifting approach).
288 See supra note 252 and accompanying text (addressing the concern of Justice Thomas
that the qualification or exception to the general no-probable-cause requirement of the Nieves
rules might harm law enforcement).
289 See supra note 257 and accompanying text (addressing this concern expressed by
Justice Gorsuch).
290 See supra notes 57–58, 214–17 and accompanying text (addressing the concerns of
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor about the roles of the press and the impact of the Nieves
rule on journalists).
291 See supra notes 57–58, 214–17 and accompanying text.
292 Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1734 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment
in part, dissenting in part).
293 Id. at 1735.
294 Id. at 1740 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
295 Justice Gorsuch wrote:
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The fact that the other Justices sidestepped directly addressing the Free Press
Clause and the vital functions performed by journalists is sadly unsurprising. That
is because Nieves fits within the current “trend toward less positive characterizations
of the press by the Supreme Court.”296 Nieves certainly does not mark a return to
what Professor RonNell Andersen Jones refers to as the glory-days era, from the
1960s through the early 1980s, when “the Court went out of its way to speak of the
press and then offered effusively complimentary depictions of the media in its
opinions.”297
In short, Nieves offers a toe-dip-deep exploration into the current Court’s beliefs
about the roles the press plays in the United States as the tribunal enters the 2020s.
In an arguably dire and perilous era for journalists,298 champions of a free press—a
Fourth Estate299 unshackled from judicial concerns about shielding officers from
time-consuming litigation300—surely would have been happier in Nieves with a fuller
throated and a more unified articulation and defense of journalistic endeavors,
particularly regarding how journalists play a vital role in checking abuse of police
powers. Nieves thus likely leaves First Amendment advocates satisfied with neither
the rule it creates nor the tepid defense of a free press that it uptakes. With this in
mind, the Article now turns to the last of the trio of First Amendment–affecting
cases it addresses, Iancu v. Brunetti.
In our own time and place, criminal laws have grown so exuberantly
and come to cover so much previously innocent conduct that almost
anyone can be arrested for something. If the state could use these laws
not for their intended purposes but to silence those who voice unpopular
ideas, little would be left of our First Amendment liberties, and little
would separate us from the tyrannies of the past or the malignant fiefdoms
of our own age.
Id. at 1730 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
296 RonNell Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and Why It
Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV. 253, 268 (2014).
297 Id. at 256.
298 Supra note 189 and accompanying text (addressing attacks on the press and journalists).
299 See Erin C. Carroll, Protecting the Watchdog: Using the Freedom of Information Act
to Preference the Press, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 193, 200 (asserting that “since its inception, our
democracy has relied on the press to act as a fourth estate—to be both a facilitator of the
marketplace of ideas and a watchdog”); Patrick M. Garry, Anonymous Sources, Libel Law,
and the First Amendment, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 579, 588 (2005) (observing that “the fourth
estate model focused on the freedoms and activities of journalists, rather than on those of the
public as a whole,” and adding that under this model, “[j]ournalists would serve as agents
of the public in checking an inherently abusive government” and “the press had to possess
special rights to gather news”).
300 See Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1725 (worrying that a subjective approach to determining if
an arrest was made in retaliation for exercising a First Amendment right “could land an
officer in years of litigation” and “pose overwhelming litigation risks”).
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III. TO SAVE OR NOT TO SAVE? THAT IS A QUESTION THE COURT
FACES AFTER IANCU V. BRUNETTI
As addressed earlier, the Court in Brunetti struck down part of a federal statute
that allowed the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to deny federal registration to
immoral or scandalous marks.301 The Justices, however, were anything but united
in all parts of the decision. In fact, Brunetti spawned five opinions, including three
that offered saving constructions to spare the bar on “scandalous” marks from un-
constitutionality and one that suggested how Congress could better define that term
should it go back to the legislative drafting board.302
This Part concentrates solely on the discord over statutory construction in Brunetti
and, in particular, on the Justices’ different conceptions about when and how it is
appropriate to save from demise a statute that negatively affects free expression.
This issue is of particular importance because the Court recently has been called upon
to interpret the meaning of particular words or phrases in statutes affecting free-
speech interests.303
Brunetti involved a facial challenge304 to a federal statute that permitted the PTO
to deny registration for marks consisting of “immoral . . . or scandalous matter.”305 All
nine Justices agreed that the “immoral” facet of this statute was unconstitutional be-
cause it allowed the PTO to discriminate against viewpoints.306 Six Justices also found
that the term “scandalous” was unconstitutional due to its viewpoint-based nature.307
However, three members of the Court—Roberts, Breyer, and Sotomayor—dissented
301 Supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text.
302 Supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
303 See, e.g., Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1880–81 (2018) (pivoting on the
meaning of the word “political” used in a state statute affecting apparel that could be worn inside
polling places on election day); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144,
1149–50 (2017) (hinging partly on the meaning of the word “surcharge” used in a state statute,
and deferring to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s interpretation of that term).
304 See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019) (“Brunetti then brought a facial
challenge to the ‘immoral or scandalous’ bar in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”);
see id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (remarking on “Erik
Brunetti’s facial challenge”).
305 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
306 See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2299 (concluding, that “the ‘immoral or scandalous’ criterion”
of the federal statute “is viewpoint-based”); id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (“I agree with the majority that the ‘immoral’ portion of the provision is
not susceptible of a narrowing construction that would eliminate its viewpoint bias.”); id. at
2308 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“I agree with the Court . . . that the
bar on registering ‘immoral’ marks violates the First Amendment.”); id. at 2309 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (opining, with regard to “the word ‘immoral,’ I agree
with the majority that there is no tenable way to read it that would ameliorate the problem”
of viewpoint discrimination, and adding that immoral “clearly connotes a preference for ‘rec-
titude and morality’ over its opposite”).
307 Id. at 2299–300 (majority opinion).
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from that latter conclusion.308 What justified their saving “scandalous” from an
unconstitutional fate while the majority did not? To address that question, some
historical context about statutory interpretation is helpful.
More than eighty-five years ago in Crowell v. Benson,309 the Court expressed a
fundamental tenet of statutory construction regarding federal laws. It wrote:
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn into ques-
tion, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the ques-
tion may be avoided.310
Four years after Crowell, Justice Louis Brandeis famously identified this as one
among “a series of rules under which [the Court] has avoided passing upon a large part
of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.”311 The principle from
Crowell, as reiterated by Brandeis, “is commonly referred to as the constitutional
avoidance canon.”312 That is because it stands for the principle that “statutes should
be construed in such a way as to avoid constitutional difficulties.”313 This is distinct
from another facet of the avoidance canon, known as the last resort rule, under which
courts should avoid constitutional issues if there is another way to resolve case.314
308 See id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (finding that “a nar-
rowing construction is appropriate” for the term scandalous); id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) (agreeing “with Justice Sotomayor that, for the reasons she gives,
we should interpret the word ‘scandalous’ in the present statute to refer only to certain highly
‘vulgar’ or ‘obscene’ modes of expression”); id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (concluding that when it comes to the term “scandalous” in the statute, “a
narrowing construction would save that duly enacted legislative text by rendering it a rea-
sonable, viewpoint-neutral restriction on speech that is permissible in the context of a beneficial
governmental initiative like the trademark-registration system”).
309 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
310 Id. at 62 (citation omitted).
311 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
see id. at 348 (setting forth the principle from Crowell). The term “famously” is used in this
textual sentence because Brandeis’s concurrence in Ashwander “is among the great jurist’s
finest legal arguments—a ‘crowning statement’ of Brandeis’s dedication to judicial restraint
and dispassionate decisionmaking.” Erik Grant Luna, Of Gypsies, Juries and Judges: Con-
stitutional Adjudication in Trial Courts, 26 SW. U. L. REV. 303, 311 (1997).
312 Gunnar P. Seaquist, The Constitutional Avoidance Canon of Statutory Construction,
71 ADVOC. 25, 26 (2015).
313 Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation
of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1575 (2000).
314 See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1004
(1994) (“The ‘last resort rule’ dictates that a federal court should refuse to rule on a constitutional
issue if the case can be resolved on a nonconstitutional basis.”); Michael L. Wells, The
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Crowell’s notion of whether an interpretation is “fairly possible”315 amounts to
a plausible-interpretation standard, allowing the Court to adopt a saving construction
that avoids a constitutional problem when “choosing between competing plausible
interpretations of a statutory text.”316 In brief, “courts should never invalidate a
statute if a plausible alternative interpretation would sustain the law.”317 Plausibility,
in turn, implies reasonableness.318 And in facial challenges such as Brunetti, a limiting
construction may be imposed “on a statute only if it is ‘readily susceptible’ to such
a construction.”319 Additionally, the Court will not adopt a saving construction if that
construction “is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”320
Professor Anita Krishnakumar wrote in 2019 that the Court, early on under
Chief Justice Roberts’s leadership, developed a “reputation for aggressively using the
avoidance canon to rewrite statutes in several controversial, high-profile cases.”321
She explained that the Roberts Court would do this by addressing “the constitutional
infirmity at length and then would pivot and invoke the canon of constitutional
avoidance to justify limiting the statute’s reach or otherwise construing the relevant
provision so as to avoid the constitutional difficulty—even if doing so required
straining the statute’s text.”322 Indeed, Neal Kumar Katyal and Thomas Schmidt
“Order-of-Battle” in Constitutional Litigation, 60 SMU L. REV. 1539, 1547–52 (2007)
(providing an overview of the last resort rule as one component of the constitutional avoid-
ance canon).
A recent example of the Supreme Court using the last resort rule in a First Amendment
case is Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). The Court there resolved a case
involving threats of violence on federal statutory grounds, thus allowing it to avoid the First
Amendment issue. See id. at 2012 (“Given our disposition, it is not necessary to consider any
First Amendment issues.”). This comports with Justice Brandeis’s articulation of last resort
rule, as part of the avoidance canon, in Ashwander:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of. . . . Thus, if a case can be decided
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will
decide only the latter.
Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347.
315 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 62.
316 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).
317 John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP.
CT. REV. 223, 253.
318 Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) (“The elementary rule is that every
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitution-
ality.” (emphasis added)).
319 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997).
320 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
321 Anita S. Krishnakumar, Passive Avoidance, 71 STAN. L. REV. 513, 517 (2019) (cita-
tions omitted).
322 Id. at 516–17 (citations omitted).
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wrote in 2015 that “[i]n the last few years, the Supreme Court has resolved some of
the most divisive and consequential cases before it with the same maneuver: con-
struing statutes to avoid constitutional difficulty.”323
In Brunetti, however, the Court abandoned that tack. The government had argued
that the ban on registering immoral or scandalous marks was subject to a limiting
construction that would eliminate the problem of viewpoint discrimination.324 Specifi-
cally, it asserted that the ban only targeted vulgar, lewd, sexually explicit, or profane
modes of expressing ideas, regardless of the underlying viewpoints.325 In other words,
the ban could be construed narrowly to restrict only the manner in which a view-
point is expressed—how it is expressed—not the substance of the viewpoint.326
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Elena Kagan refused to adopt
such a construction because, as she bluntly put it, “the statute says something
markedly different.”327 More specifically, she rebuffed saving the statute because it
was not ambiguous.328 It thus did not afford the Court interpretative room to locate
the government’s construction lurking “in the statutory language.”329 In other words,
the lack of ambiguity prohibited the majority from engaging in constitutional
avoidance and finding within the statute the limited, saving meaning the government
323 Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme
Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2110 (2015).
324 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2301 (2019).
325 Id.
326 Perhaps one way to understand this potential mode-of-expression limiting construction
is to consider Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). The Court there protected a person’s
right to wear a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” in a Los Angeles courthouse as a
means of expressing his disdain for the war in Vietnam and conscription. See id. at 16 (“The
defendant testified that he wore the jacket knowing that the words were on the jacket as a
means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the
draft.”). Viewpoint discrimination would have existed in Cohen if California had punished
Paul Robert Cohen for expressing an anti-draft or anti-war viewpoint, such as “I object to the
Draft.” A vulgar mode-of-expression bar, on the other hand, would target only the way in
which Cohen expressed his anti-draft viewpoint by using the word “fuck.” As the author of
this Article explained elsewhere before the Court ruled in Brunetti:
“[F]uck” is what offended in Cohen, not Cohen’s viewpoint about con-
scription. “Fuck” is not a viewpoint. It is not even a viewpoint about
sex. It is, instead, a word that violates certain norms of civil discourse in
polite society and thus gives offense to some people by its very utterance.
Clay Calvert, Merging Offensive-Speech Cases with Viewpoint-Discrimination Principles:
The Immediate Impact of Matal v. Tam on Two Strands of First Amendment Jurisprudence,
27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 829, 836 (2019).
327 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2301.
328 See id. (noting that a saving construction is possible “only when ambiguity exists”); see
also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009) (“The so-called canon of
constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool, counseling that ambiguous statutory language
be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
329 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2301.
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sought.330 Instead, the Court would need to rewrite the statute in order to adopt the
government’s limiting construction, and this was something the majority, citing
precedent, was unwilling to do.331 As Justice Kagan wrote, “To cut the statute off
where the Government urges is not to interpret the statute Congress enacted, but to
fashion a new one.”332 This implies a crucial dichotomy between interpreting and
rewriting, with the former permitted when ambiguity exists and the latter barred
when it does not.
Moreover, the majority was unwilling to perform what Kagan called “statutory
surgery”333 to save the term “scandalous” by carving it out and moving it away to
safety while letting “immoral” suffer an unconstitutional fate. The reason for such
disinclination, as Kagan explained, was that the term scandalous was “not ‘ambigu-
ous,’”334 but, instead, was “just broad.”335 It was so broad, in fact, as to sweep up
“both marks that offend by the ideas they convey and marks that offend by their
mode of expression. And its coverage of the former means that it discriminates
based on viewpoint.”336
For the majority, then, there was a critical difference between statutory ambigu-
ity, on the one hand, and statutory breadth, on the other. Ambiguity of meaning
might have allowed the majority to save both the immoral and scandalous facets of
the federal statute at issue in Brunetti.337 The problem, at least for the majority, was
that the meaning was unambiguous and, in turn, that it stretched far beyond the
narrow interpretation the government sought, while not offering, by its terms, a
mode-of-expression endpoint where the majority could constitutionally confine it.338
330 Indeed, the statutory language covered so much territory and was far too expansive for
the Court to limit its reach. As Justice Kagan wrote:
The “immoral or scandalous” bar stretches far beyond the Government’s
proposed construction. The statute as written does not draw the line at
lewd, sexually explicit, or profane marks. Nor does it refer only to marks
whose “mode of expression,” independent of viewpoint, is particularly
offensive. . . . It covers the universe of immoral or scandalous—or (to
use some PTO synonyms) offensive or disreputable—material. Whether
or not lewd or profane. Whether the scandal and immorality comes from
mode or instead from viewpoint.
Id. at 2301–02 (internal citation omitted).
331 See id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481 (2010) for the proposition
that “[w]e will not rewrite a law to conform it to constitutional requirements”).
332 Id. at 2302.
333 Id. at 2302 n.* (unnumbered footnote designated by an asterisk).
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 Id. (emphasis omitted).
337 Cf. Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare
Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69
MD. L. REV. 791, 799–803 (2010) (providing a discussion of the problems in defining the
concept of “ambiguity” in the context of statutory interpretation).
338 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2301 (“The statute as written does not draw the line at lewd,
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In a nutshell, the Brunetti majority refused to proffer a saving construction for
the bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks. In doing so, it delivered a clear
victory for free speech, wiping away a statutory impediment for registration based
upon a mark’s content and, more specifically, an impediment that tolerated view-
point discrimination.339 Along with the Court’s 2017 decision in Matal v. Tam340
declaring unconstitutional a federal ban on registering disparaging marks,341 the
Court now has cleared a wide path toward registering seemingly all manners of
marks that may cause offense.342
As noted earlier, however, three Justices—Roberts, Breyer, and Sotomayor—saw
it quite differently. Driven by worries about a cultural and commercial landscape in
which offensive marks (including racist ones) would run roughshod and amok,343 the
sexually explicit, or profane marks. Nor does it refer only to marks whose ‘mode of expres-
sion,’ independent of viewpoint, is particularly offensive.”).
339 As Justice Kagan encapsulated it, the immoral or scandalous provision “disfavors certain
ideas.” Id. at 2297. The provision, in turn, “is viewpoint-based.” Id. at 2299.
340 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
341 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2019) (allowing the PTO to deny registration to marks “which
may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols”).
342 Tam centered on an Asian American band’s efforts to register its name, The Slants, as
a mark with the PTO. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. The PTO rebuffed that attempt, deeming the
name disparaging to Asian Americans. Id. The band’s leader, Simon Tam, readily acknowledged
the negative connotations of the term, but stated that his band adopted the “moniker in order
to ‘reclaim’ and ‘take ownership’ of stereotypes about people of Asian ethnicity.” Id. at
1754. The Supreme Court, without dissent, struck down the disparagement clause, handing
a victory to the band and Simon Tam. Id. at 1751. In delivering the Court’s judgment, Justice
Samuel Alito wrote that the disparagement clause “offends a bedrock First Amendment
principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.” Id.
In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena
Kagan, Justice Anthony Kennedy emphasized that the disparagement clause impermissibly
allowed the government to engage in “viewpoint discrimination—a form of speech suppression
so potent that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional scrutiny.” Id. at 1765 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment). Ultimately, as Justice Kagan explained in
Brunetti, “all Members of the Court [in Tam] agreed that the [disparagement] provision vio-
lated the First Amendment because it discriminated on the basis of viewpoint.” Brunetti, 139
S. Ct. at 2297.
343 Justice Sotomayor, for example, feared a “coming rush to register” what she predicted
would be “marks containing the most vulgar, profane, or obscene words and images imagin-
able.” Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Ad-
ditionally, she worried that “at least one particularly egregious racial epithet” would be
registerable after Brunetti. Id. at 2311 n.5. Chief Justice Roberts was concerned about the
government being associated with and giving “aid and comfort to those using obscene, vulgar,
and profane modes of expression” via the benefits that come from federal trademark registration.
Id. at 2303–04 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Breyer fretted
about the psychological and emotional impact of vulgar marks on consumers and children.
Id. at 2307 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). As he bluntly put it, “Just think
about how you might react if you saw someone wearing a t-shirt or using a product emblazoned
with an odious racial epithet.” Id.
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trio would have saved the scandalous provision, thus pushing back against the First
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech.344 Justice Sotomayor voiced the most thorough
discussion of why and how the bar on registering scandalous marks could be re-
suscitated. Her opinion thus is the focus here.
Justice Sotomayor’s decision that the scandalous facet of the law could be saved
hinged largely on three related and sequential meaning-based determinations. Spe-
cifically, Sotomayor reasoned:
(1) the meaning of “scandalous” was—in contrast to the majority’s conclu-
sion345—ambiguous, particularly regarding the type of offensiveness it
targeted, thus opening the door for a possible saving construction;346
(2) Congress must have intended “scandalous” to mean something different
from both “immoral” and “disparage” found nearby in the same statute,347
rather than it being redundant or duplicative of those terms;348 and
(3) the different meaning of offensiveness that Congress must have in-
tended for “scandalous”—“marks that employ an offensive mode of
expression”349—renders this part of the statute viewpoint neutral, unlike
the constitutionally problematic viewpoint-based nature of “immoral”
and “disparage,” and thereby permissible in the regulatory context of
trademark law.350
344 See supra note 308 and accompanying text (noting how these three Justices would
have saved the “scandalous” provision).
345 See supra notes 334–35 and accompanying text (noting the majority’s determination
that the meaning of scandalous was not ambiguous, just broad).
346 Justice Sotomayor explained that “[t]he word “scandalous” on its own . . . is ambiguous:
It can be read broadly (to cover both offensive ideas and offensive manners of expressing
ideas), or it can be read narrowly (to cover only offensive modes of expression). That alone
raises the possibility that a limiting construction might be appropriate.” Brunetti, 139 S. Ct.
at 2309 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
347 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2019).
348 In terms of the different meanings for these three terms, Justice Sotomayor wrote:
With marks that are offensive because they are disparaging and marks
that are offensive because they are immoral already covered, what work
did Congress intend for “scandalous” to do? A logical answer is that
Congress meant for “scandalous” to target a third and distinct type of
offensiveness: offensiveness in the mode of communication rather than
the idea. The other two words cover marks that are offensive because
of the ideas they express; the “scandalous” clause covers marks that are
offensive because of the mode of expression, apart from any particular
message or idea.
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2310.
349 Id. at 2313.
350 See id. (“Properly narrowed, ‘scandalous’ is a viewpoint-neutral form of content dis-
crimination that is permissible in the kind of discretionary governmental program or limited
forum typified by the trademark-registration system.”).
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Regarding the threshold ambiguity determination, Sotomayor invoked several
dictionary definitions of scandalous to conclude that it could mean not only sub-
stantive ideas that cause offense, but also offensive modes of conveying ideas.351
Those options, in turn, created definitional ambiguity: Should scandalous, as used
by Congress, mean or encompass both of those possibilities or only one and, if only
one, which one? For Justice Sotomayor, the statutory meaning was limited to only
one possibility—scandalous meant offensive modes of expression, regardless of the
ideas and views conveyed.352 That had to be the meaning Congress intended because
the terms “immoral” and “disparage,” which appear in extremely close proximity
to “scandalous” within the same statute,353 address very different notions of offen-
siveness, and definitional duplicativeness (i.e., scandalous meaning the same thing
as either immoral or disparage) would amount to Congress wasting words.354
Put differently, examination of the meaning of “immoral” and “disparage” led
Justice Sotomayor to the limited, saving meaning of “scandalous.”355 Surely “scan-
dalous” tapped into a different facet of the broader concept of offensiveness than the
other two terms did because Congress must have intended it to mean something
different.356 She emphasized that the meaning of any one word generally cannot be
determined by isolating it from others proximate to it—context, instead, is key357—and
that, to the extent possible, statutory words should not be construed by courts as
meaningless or duplicative of others.358 She pointed out here that the statute in question
actually interjected an unrelated word—“deceptive”—directly in between the words
“immoral” and “scandalous,”359 while also later mixing in “a lengthy series of other,
unrelated concepts.”360 For Justice Sotomayor, this all suggested that “immoral” and
“scandalous” “need not be interpreted as mutually reinforcing.”361 She went on to
351 Id. at 2309.
352 See id. at 2310 (concluding that “the ‘scandalous’ clause covers marks that are of-
fensive because of the mode of expression, apart from any particular message or idea”).
353 The three terms appearing within a span of a mere ten words. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)
(2019) (regulating “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage”).
354 Specifically, “disparage” targets marks that cause offense by deriding “a particular person
or group,” while “immoral” marks are those that cause offense by “transgress[ing] widely
held moral beliefs.” Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2310.
355 Supra note 348 and accompanying text.
356 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2310.
357 See id. at 2309 (“It is foundational ‘that a statute is to be read as a whole, since the
meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.’” (quoting King v. St. Vincent’s
Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991))).
358 See id. (asserting that “courts should, to the extent possible, read statutes so that ‘no
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” (quoting TRW Inc.
v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001))).
359 See 15 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (2019) (allowing the PTO to deny registration for a mark that
“consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter”).
360 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2310.
361 Id. at 2311.
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flesh out her offensive-mode-of-expression interpretation of scandalous by contend-
ing that it would cover “only those marks that are obscene, vulgar, or profane.”362
What lessons are to be gleaned from the split in Brunetti regarding statutory
construction and whether to save a statute affecting free speech? First, it appears that
principles of statutory construction are so malleable that they can readily be manipu-
lated to reach desired outcomes, almost as easily as the state action doctrine was
manipulated by the opposing conservative and liberal blocs in Halleck to reach
radically different ends affecting First Amendment interests.363
Consider the divide in Brunetti over the application of the crucial concept of
ambiguity.364 The majority concluded the statutory bar on scandalous marks was not
ambiguous; it was, instead, simply broad.365 Statutory ambiguity and breadth thus
are distinct concepts for the majority, with the former being a necessary condition
for interpreting a statute in a manner that avoids constitutional doubts.366 In brief,
because the term scandalous was unambiguous (albeit also broad), that facet of the
statute could not be saved by the Court. The solution, as Justice Alito put in his
concurrence, was for Congress—not the judiciary367—to pen “a more carefully fo-
cused statute that precludes the registration of marks containing vulgar terms that
play no real part in the expression of ideas.”368
In direct contrast, Justice Sotomayor concluded that the same provision was, in
fact, ambiguous.369 How so? Because, as Sotomayor wrote, it could “be read broadly
(to cover both offensive ideas and offensive manners of expressing ideas), or it
[could] be read narrowly (to cover only offensive modes of expression).”370 That
explanation, with its use of the term “read broadly,” seemingly blurs the key dichot-
omy the majority drew between ambiguity and breadth. The majority, in fact, readily
agreed that the scandalous provision “includes both marks that offend by the ideas
they convey and marks that offend by their mode of expression,”371 but for it, this
simply made the statute broad, not ambiguous.372
362 Id. at 2318.
363 See supra Part I (analyzing Halleck).
364 Ambiguity is crucial because its existence is a necessary condition—a condition
precedent—for the Court to exercise its power to construe a statute in a manner that avoids
constitutional doubts. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2301 (noting that the ability to interpret a
statute in a way that avoids serious constitutional doubts occurs “only when ambiguity exists”).
365 Id. at 2302 n.* (unnumbered footnote designated by an asterisk). Justice Kagan added
that “the ‘immoral or scandalous’ bar is substantially overbroad.” Id. at 2302.
366 Supra notes 334–35 and accompanying text.
367 See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring) (reasoning that “we are not
legislators and cannot substitute a new statute for the one now in force”).
368 Id.
369 Id. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part).
370 Id.
371 Id. at 2302, n.* (majority opinion) (emphasis omitted) (unnumbered footnote desig-
nated by an asterisk).
372 See id. (concluding the scandalous bar “is just broad”).
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So, just as one bloc of Justices in Halleck found the existence of state action while
another bloc did not, one group of Justices in Brunetti (led by Justice Sotomayor,
with whom both Chief Justice Roberts373 and Justice Breyer374 agreed) found the
presence of statutory ambiguity while another bloc (the six-Justice majority) did not.
The fact that two groups of Justices can interpret the exact same word in counter-
posed ways that, in turn, lead to dramatically different First Amendment implica-
tions recalls an aphorism from the nation’s high court nearly fifty years ago. In
considering how people might view the phrase “fuck the draft,” the Court in Cohen
v. California wittily wrote that it is “often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s
lyric.”375 Perhaps it should now be said, after Brunetti, that one Justice’s (Sotomayor’s)
conclusion of statutory ambiguity is another Justice’s (Kagan’s) conclusion of
statutory breadth. More importantly, it is apparent that the Justices must now de-
lineate a clear, agreed-upon test for ambiguity. Furthermore, they must carefully
explain the critical (at least, for the majority) distinction between a statute being
ambiguous and a statute being broad. In cases such as Brunetti, First Amendment
rights lie in the balance.
A second aspect of statutory interpretation in First Amendment cases also must
be clarified in light of Brunetti. If one assumes, arguendo, that the meaning of
“scandalous” is ambiguous (as Justice Sotomayor found it was), then to what extent
should the Justices be allowed to fathom the intent of legislators about that word’s
(in Brunetti, “scandalous”) meaning from the fact that it is positioned statutorily
adjacent to or nearby other words that also seemingly tap into a much larger concept
(in Brunetti, the much larger concept being offensiveness, and the other key words
being “immoral” and “disparage”)? Justice Sotomayor’s saving interpretation of the
scandalous provision, after she initially found it ambiguous, largely pivoted on the
following chain of logic:
(1) All three words—scandalous, immoral, and disparage—relate to (or are
subsumed under) the macro concept of offensive speech;
(2) the macro concept of offensive speech has many different facets that
might be regulated;
(3) the Court should give the benefit of the doubt to lawmakers that they
intended each of the three words to tap into or sync up with a different
facet of the macro concept of offensive speech rather than being redun-
dant or duplicative in their regulatory effects;376 and
373 Id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“I agree with Justice
Sotomayor that such a narrowing construction is appropriate in this context.”).
374 Id. at 2308 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“Because Justice
Sotomayor reaches the same conclusions, using roughly similar reasoning, I join her opinion
insofar as it is consistent with the views set forth here.”).
375 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
376 The first three steps are rooted in the following statement by Justice Sotomayor:
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(4) the different facet of the macro concept of offensive speech into which
the word in question (here, scandalous) taps allows that word to possess
a definition that avoids the constitutional pitfalls of the other two words
(in Brunetti and Tam, respectively, the words “immoral” and “dispar-
age” were plagued by their viewpoint-discriminatory nature).377
Justice Sotomayor, in justifying her conclusion, cited the Court’s decades-old
precedential statement that a “cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save
and not to destroy.”378 Her logic, however, has multiple steps that arguably stretch
this principle, based upon assumptions about both legislative intent and words
carrying precise, discrete meanings, to a breaking point. Furthermore, the potential
implications for such logic on First Amendment jurisprudence are vast.
For example, imagine a statute that uses multiple words to regulate another
macro-level form of speech that, like offensiveness,379 generally is protected by the
First Amendment: hate speech.380 If a legislative body strategically added multiple
words into a statute regulating hate speech, and if those words supposedly tapped
into different facets of the macro-level concept of hate speech, then it might just be
that the Court could determine that one of those many words permissibly regulated
a niche aspect of hate speech not previously regulatable under the First Amendment.
With marks that are offensive because they are disparaging and marks
that are offensive because they are immoral already covered, what
work did Congress intend for “scandalous” to do? A logical answer is
that Congress meant for “scandalous” to target a third and distinct type
of offensiveness: offensiveness in the mode of communication rather
than the idea. The other two words cover marks that are offensive be-
cause of the ideas they express; the “scandalous” clause covers marks
that are offensive because of the mode of expression, apart from any
particular message or idea.
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2310 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
377 See supra notes 306, 342 and accompanying text (addressing the respective con-
clusions in Brunetti and Tam that these two words permitted the PTO to engage in viewpoint
discrimination).
378 Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
379 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (calling it “a bedrock First Amendment
principle” that “[s]peech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend”);
see also Leslie Kendrick, The Answers and the Questions in First Amendment Law, in
CHARLOTTESVILLE 2017: THE LEGACY OF RACE AND INEQUITY 70, 70–71 (Louis P. Nelson
& Claudrena N. Harold eds., 2018) (“In America, hate speech is not a legal category. The First
Amendment protects most speech on matters of public concern, even if that speech is racist,
anti-Semitic, or otherwise counter to our nation’s commitment to the fundamental equality
of all people.”).
380 See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (“Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender,
religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our
free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”
(quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929))).
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Put more colloquially, if one slices and dices a macro-level concept into small
enough slivers of meaning by using a bevy of different words to describe it, then one
of those slivers might just slide under the metaphorical radar of the First Amend-
ment’s protection of free expression. Such statutory construction, in other words,
has the potential to spade new First Amendment ground.
In summary, the split over statutory construction in Brunetti carries troubling
implications for First Amendment rights. Although the majority struck down both
the immoral and scandalous aspects of the federal law at issue in the case, three
Justices found sufficient ambiguity with the scandalous facet to save it. The question
of when a statute is, indeed, ambiguous and when, instead, it is merely broad, is called
into high relief by Brunetti and demands clarification.
CONCLUSION
This Article rendered vivid multiple disagreements among the Justices in a trio
of First Amendment decisions delivered by the Supreme Court in 2019. As the Court
enters the 2020s, First Amendment jurisprudence is profoundly plagued by, among
other problems, ideological partisanship in cases such as Halleck.381 The Justices
now must rise above their apparent political leanings both to restore public confi-
dence in the Court382 and establish some semblance of doctrinal order in First
Amendment law. In just two years, three five-to-four rulings affecting free speech—
Becerra,383 Janus,384 and Halleck385—were divided consistently along perceived
conservative and liberal lines. In the process, this shredded whatever illusion of
judicial impartiality remains when free speech affects abortion,386 unions,387 and
381 See supra Part I (analyzing Halleck).
382 See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text (providing recent data regarding public
perceptions of the Court).
383 Supra note 30 and accompanying text.
384 Supra note 31 and accompanying text.
385 See supra Part I (analyzing Halleck).
386 The outcome in Becerra, described earlier in footnote 30, was “consistent with [the]
anti-abortion ideological leanings of the majority.” Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin,
Constitutional Gerrymandering Against Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 61, 66 (2019). The outcome has been described as being “primarily about five conservative
Justices’ hostility to abortion rights. The Court ignored legal precedent, failed to weigh the
interests at stake in its decision, and applied a more demanding standard based on content
of speech.” Id.
387 See Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine L. Fisk, Exaggerating the Effects of Janus: A Reply
to Professors Baude and Volokh, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 42, 57 (2018) (remarking on the Court’s
“obvious hostility to public employee unions in Janus”); J. Maria Glover, All Balls and No
Strikes: The Roberts Court’s Anti-Worker Activism, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 129, 133 (2019)
(asserting that in Janus, “the conservative members of the Court engaged in an aggressive
interpretation of the right to free speech and expression embodied in the First Amendment in
order to reduce employee access to collective action, diminish employee power at the
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business entities.388 While the Court, under Chief Justice Roberts, may be involved
in First Amendment expansionism,389 Halleck proves that the conservative Justices
can dial back the reach of the First Amendment when its strictures might interfere
with the decisions of a business entity engaged in a speech-based enterprise.
Nieves reveals two very different sorts of problems. First, in future cases like it
that affect the press, more than just two Justices need to make a forceful case about
the important roles that both professional and citizen journalists play in a democratic
society.390 After all, “the First Amendment preserves democracy, while the U.S.
Supreme Court protects the First Amendment.”391 Without the Court’s protection
and support of the press as an institution specifically shielded by the First Amend-
ment under the Press Clause, democracy is jeopardized, especially in an era when
the press finds itself under attack by government officials and others.392 Although
the meaning of the Press Clause may be “elusive,”393 the majority of the Justices in
Nieves punted on a prime opportunity to clarify the importance of the journalistic
endeavors that it should protect.
Second, Nieves provides a model example of how not to construct a federal rule
affecting the press. As this Article explained, the Justices had multiple quarrels in
fashioning a rule that supposedly defines the relationship between First Amend-
ment–based retaliatory arrest claims filed under Section 1983 and the impact of a
finding of probable cause to arrest under the Fourth Amendment.394 The Article con-
tended that the rifts in Nieves over its rule are substantially different from (and much
more troublesome than) the division more than a half-century ago in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, when the Court adopted another federal rule—actual malice—affecting
speech and press rights in defamation law that has withstood the test of time.395
bargaining table, and advance employer-based economic and (de)regulatory policy”); Zachary
S. Price, Symmetric Constitutionalism: An Essay on Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Post-
Kennedy Supreme Court, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1298 (2019) (describing the Court’s ruling
in Janus as “a one-sided blow to the liberal coalition”).
388 See supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text (describing how Halleck can be per-
ceived as protecting a business entity against the intrusive forces of big government that
would have affected that entity had state action been found to exist).
389 See generally Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1199 (2015) (addressing both the meaning and examples of First Amendment expansionism).
390 See supra notes 57–58, 214–17, 291–95 and accompanying text (describing how only
two Justices in Nieves—Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor—directly considered
the impact of the rule created in that case on the press).
391 Bruce Ledewitz, Taking the Threat to Democracy Seriously, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 1305,
1327 (2019).
392 See supra note 189 and accompanying text (addressing hostility toward the press today).
393 JARED SCHROEDER, THE PRESS CLAUSE AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY’S FOURTH WAVE:
MEDIA LAW AND THE SYMBIOTIC WEB 89 (2018).
394 See supra Part II (analyzing Nieves).
395 See supra notes 286–89 and accompanying text (summarizing concerns about the rule
created in Nieves).
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Finally, Brunetti exposes startling inconsistencies in statutory interpretation and
construction when the First Amendment freedom of expression is at risk. Most
notably, the Justices disagreed when it came to the threshold issue that determines
whether or not a saving construction is even possible—namely, if a statute’s mean-
ing is ambiguous.396 What ambiguity means and how it is different from statutory
breadth must be better spelled out by the Court so that future rifts like that over the
meaning of scandalous in Brunetti do not arise. As suggested above, the implications
of the interpretative logic adopted by Justice Sotomayor could flow beyond the realm
of offensive expression to hate speech.397
396 See supra Part III (analyzing Brunetti).
397 See supra notes 379–80 and accompanying text that immediately follows in that
paragraph.
